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Abstract 
I intend to analyse to which extent the characteristics of firms and the structure of the board of 
directors is taken into account by creditors deciding when to invest in a corporate bond issue 
or not.  The perception of creditors is extracted by analyzing how the corporate bonds spread 
relates to board independence, experience, diversity and size which may be considered to be 
important determinants of corporate governance and performance of the board. Technically, 
the results are documented using multiple regression models estimated by ordinary least 
squares on a dataset consisting of 1341 bonds. My findings include a negative relation of 
experience and a positive relation of board size to the corporate bond spread, while my 
findings are inconclusive with respect to board diversity and independence. In sum, these 
results explain how investors either explicitly or implicitly take into account the structure of 
the board before investing in corporate bonds. With regard to the firm, I document a relation 
of size, asset turnover and return volatility, while leverage seems unrelated to the spread.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The breakdown of corporate governance preceding the failures of WorldCom, Enron and 
Tycon, sparked an intensive debate of whether the board of directors had been sleeping on 
duty. This debate suggested a number of changes to boards in order to improve the corporate 
governance of firms.  One contribution is “Back to the drawing board: designing corporate 
boards for a complex world” by Carter and Lorsch  (2004), who argue in favour of a reduction 
in board size, increased number of independent directors and boards chaired by an 
independent director.  Meanwhile, the Norwegian government has enacted a law, which states 
that 40 percent of all boards of publicly listed firms shall consist of female directors (The 
Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, 2008), in an effort to increase gender 
diveristy. A number of articles have been investigating how the board structure affects the 
performance and market value of firms, still, few have delved into how these reforms and 
regulation are perceived by creditors.  
The perception of creditors can be extracted by analysing how the risk premium of corporate 
bonds relates to the structure of corporate boards. The risk premium, henceforth the corporate 
bond spread, is the difference between the required rate of return on a corporate bond and a 
government bond (Bodie, 2001). Government bonds issued by financially healthy countries, 
like Norway, are assumed to be free of default risk. For corporate bonds, however, the 
expected return depends on the risk of default and recovery in case of default, leading to these 
factors being important determinants of the spread. The spread is accordingly often referred to 
as the default premium on corporate bonds (Bodie, 2001). I oftentimes refer to the spread as 
the cost of debt, justified by how the spread measures the cost of borrowing in excess of the 
risk free interest rate. 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the relation between the board structure and 
the corporate bond spread. My contribution is first and foremost to increase the quantity of 
research in light of the limited number of publications issued investigating the relation 
between board structure and the cost of debt. Secondly, using a Norwegian dataset enables me 
to examine the stability of relationships found in articles in other countries. Norwegian 
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business life has some advantageous distinctive characteristics in this respect, as boards are 
smaller and more independent compared to the American firms usually studied, which proves 
to be an interesting board environment when it comes to testing the findings of other authors 
(explained in part 5.5).  
I have collected a comprehensive dataset containing  1341 bonds, which includes most 
corporate bonds issued after 1997, and coupled them with a wide array of firm and board 
characteristics. This allows for estimation of the effect of different board characteristics on the 
spread, holding all other bond, firm and board characteristics constant. It is not only the 
quantity of measures that set this thesis apart, but also the use of a different measure of board 
independence from management, which is based on the tenure of the board relative to the 
CEO. This measure has a number of advantages relative to alternative independence 
measures, as is discussed in part 2.5, and it is interesting to note how the findings of other 
authors compares to this alternate measure.  
Even though my focus of attention will be on the board structure, I intend to estimate and 
discuss a rigorous base model on how to control how firm and bond characteristics relate to 
the spread.  A general discussion of factors affecting the spread is interesting in view of the 
phenomenal growth in outstanding value of bonds and the increased scope of firms and 
industries issuing bonds (figure 2).  This has enhanced the breath and share number of bonds 
available to researchers, which enables more extensive research on the corporate bond spread 
of the Norwegian bond market.  
I estimate multiple regression models in order to estimate rigorous relations to the individual 
variables by discovering “ceteris paribus” relationships, i.e. the relation of one variable 
holding all other relevant factors constant. The multiple regression models are estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, which is discussed in detail in part 6.  
My findings indicate that creditors, either consciously or unconsciously, take into account the 
structure of the board when deciding to invest in a corporate bond, evident by a negative 
relation of average tenure and age of the board members and a positive relation of board size 
to the corporate bond spread. A number of expected relations to the bond spread of firm and 
bond characteristics are also confirmed, such as a negative issue and firm size and a positive 
relation of firm risk. Leverage, having a theoretical relation to default risk, proved unrelated 
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to the corporate bond spread. The interpretation and implications of these findings are 
discussed in detail as I present my findings.  
The thesis is organized in a traditional manner, starting off with a theoretical description, 
followed by a description of the data collection process and the dataset, before my findings 
are being presented. In more detail, section 2 offers a theoretical description of how the 
corporate bond spread relates to bond, firm and board characteristics. I start out with a 
description of the relationships expected to firm variables using option theory and the 
relations documented in other papers that investigate the bond spread (part 2.1). I then extend 
my knowledge by reviewing to which extent default risk can explain the observed bond 
spreads, in order to anchor my expectations of the importance of firm characteristics.  
In section 2.2 I review some of the most important papers investigating bond and bond market 
characteristics, such as liquidity, maturity and a number of contractual features, before I focus 
on board qualities by defining the board of directors in section 2.3. Section 2.4 deals with and 
relates corporate governance to creditors by presenting three governance problems, and 
proceeds with explaining how a well-equipped board can lower the cost of debt by mitigating 
these governance problems. Sections 2.5 to 2.8 define board independence, experience, 
diversity and the number of board members as four important determinants as to the 
effectiveness of a board, and carry on with a discussion of their theoretical and empirical 
relation to the performance of the board and the cost of debt.  
A general description of the Norwegian bond market, the data collection process and the 
dataset follows in sections 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Part 6 discusses any econometric pitfalls 
and the underlying assumptions of the estimation method thought to be important to the 
analysis of my findings.  In section 7 I analyse and discuss my findings. The section is 
structured similar to the theoretical discussion in part 2, dividing the presentation and 
discussion of the results into firm, bond and the four board characteristics. Section 8 
summarizes on the importance of the different predictors of the cost of debt. Note that the 
most important regression models will be presented in the main text, while tables related to 
the robustness sections, variable descriptions and correlation matrices are presented in the 
appendix.  
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Two articles serve as sources of inspiration. “Board characteristics, accounting report integrity 
and the cost of debt” by Anderson et al. (2004) relates a range of board characteristics, 
focussing on independence, board size and audit committee structure, to the cost of debt. They 
find, using a sample of 252 S&P500 industrial firms surveyed annually, that the board 
structure is related to the cost of debt.  “Aligned, informed, and decisive:  Characteristics of 
value-creating boards” by Bøhren and Strøm (2007) is a Norwegian cousin of the growing 
literature on board characteristics and firm performance. Performance is measured as market 
value of assets divided by book value of assets (Tobin’s Q). Data is collected on all non-
financial firms listed on the Oslo stock Exchange from 1989 to 2002, and thus differs relative 
to my sample with regard to both time and firm composition. Their econometric model of 
choice is fixed effect estimation.  This article serves as a local reference on board 
characteristics and performance, and is used to compare and discuss my findings relative to 
the findings of the performance literature. The details of these articles will be discussed in 
relation to the relevant board characteristics discussed below.  
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2. Determinants of the corporate bond spread 
 
2.1 Firm characteristics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Creditor’s position in the debt option framework 
I now intend to explore the theoretical relation of firm characteristics to the corporate bond 
spread by the use of an option model, in order to motivate the inclusion of different firm 
characteristics in the regression models. Owners of limited companies have the option to 
declare the company bankrupt, walk away, and hand any remaining assets over to creditors. 
The resemblance to a position using options is striking, as limited liability can be considered a 
long position in the firm, held side by side with a put option. Creditors hold an opposite 
position, illustrated in figure 1, where they have an outstanding risk free debt and have written 
a put option to the owners of the firm. Generally, a put option grants the holder the right to 
sell an underlying asset at a predetermined exercise price. The opposite position is held by the 
option writer, who commits to buy the underlying asset from the option holder, i.e. the option 
commits the creditors to buy the firm at the face value of the debt. This commitment is put 
into effect by the owners, who as holders of the option have the right to declare the company 
bankrupt. They will ask creditors to make good of their commitment if firm value is lower 
than par value of the debt at maturity. This intuition dates back to Merton (1974) who used 
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option theory to price corporate debt.  Clearly, an increase in the value of the put option 
implies a rise in default risk resulting in a gain (loss) to the owners (creditors) (Brealey et al., 
2006). 
 
 What factors determine default risk? This question can be answered by looking at the factors 
determining the value of the put option sold by creditors. Factors increasing the value of the 
option imply a rise in default risk, as the value of the option rises when the probability of 
default increases. The value of the put option will consequently be equal to the theoretical 
bond spread. 
 Multiple factors affect the value of a put option (Hull, 2009). All 
other factors equal, a higher exercise price results in a higher 
premium, because the underlying asset is sold at a higher price. 
In the debt option framework, the owners are selling the firm to 
the creditors at the face value of debt. Increasing the amount of debt will accordingly increase 
the value of the put option, and thus results in a higher bond spread.  
Merton’s (1974) bond pricing model suggests an initially increasing negative effect of 
leverage, before the effect dampens at higher levels of debt. Brealey et al., (2006), however, 
argue, based on outcomes in the market, in favour of an increasing negative effect of leverage 
over the entire range of possible leverage ratios. This relationship emerges if the probability 
of default is insignificant at low and moderate levels of debt, but increases at an accelerating 
phase as the debt ratio reaches high levels. 
The effect of increased firm size can be deducted from the option framework in a fashion 
similar to leverage.  Increased value of firm asset for constant debt will reduce the likelihood 
of the firm ever becoming worth less than the face value of debt. It is accordingly less 
probable that the owners will find declaring the firm bankrupt profitable, which lowers the 
value of the limited liability put option. The theoretical finding of a positive relation of 
+ Put 
premium
+ Default 
risk
+ Required 
yield
+ Spread
Table 1 ∆Spread 
Volatility firm value + 
Value of firm - 
Time to maturity + 
Level of debt + 
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leverage and a negative relation of firm assets points to a positive relation to the bond spread 
of debt measured relative to total assets. 
Firm size may also be negatively related to the spread, even if the debt is increased in tandem 
with firm assets, because a blow to one activity may have a minor impact on the whole of the 
firm. The principal reason, which is unrelated to the option model, is their more diversified 
nature, operating across countries, industries and products (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  
Increased risk of the underlying asset will always work to increase the value of an option. Too 
see this in relation to the limited liability put option, consider how a very risky firm is more 
likely to experience a large fall in asset value at the turn of the business cycle. It is 
accordingly more probable that the owners will find themselves with a firm worth less than 
the outstanding value of debt, which makes exercise of the limited liability put option 
profitable. Accordingly, increased volatility will rise the value of the put option making for a 
larger expected bond spread.  
Assuming identical volatility, an option with a longer time to expiration will have more time 
for which the volatility can cause changes to the underlying asset’s value. Accordingly, a 
long-term loan has a more valuable put option attached, and this explains how the corporate 
bond spread increases with maturity. It is, in other words, more likely that a firm will go 
bankrupt during a ten year period compared to a five year period.  
Firm volatility cannot be observed directly, and will have to be estimated. Campbell et al. 
(2003) argue how equity volatility will incorporate all information available in accounting 
variables and credit rating, and is therefore the most reliable estimator of firm risk. They find 
empirical support of their claim after having documented a strong relation between the spread 
and idiosyncratic risk. They also include various accounting variables, like interest coverage 
ratio, operating income to sales, long-term debt to assets and total debt to market 
capitalization, but are not able to attach much explanatory power to these variables once credit 
rating and equity volatility is accounted for in the regression.  
The presentation of the option model assumes no costs associated with declaring a firm 
bankrupt.  On the contrary, a real world bankruptcy carries large direct and indirect cost. One 
important determinant of such value destruction is the marketability of firm assets. A 
competitive advantage, such as a brand name, has limited value outside the firm and may be 
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lost in a bankruptcy. The lower marketability of intangible assets can make for a higher 
spread of firms having very little tangible assets (Brealey et al., 2006). 
Some firm characteristics are not related to the option model, but can, nevertheless, have 
important relations to the spread. Asset turnover represents the ability of assets to generate 
sales, in other words the amount of sales generated by every kroner invested in the firm. 
Firms with a high asset turnover have a number of characteristics (Bodie et al., 2001). Firstly, 
asset turnover can be related to the competitive strategy utilized by a firm. A price leader will 
have high asset turnover by the means of high sales at a low margin, while a premium brand 
will have higher margins and lower asset turnover.  Altman (1968) argues for a relation 
between management’s ability to face competition and asset turnover and thus argues in 
favour of using high asset turnover as a predictor of default.  An industry’s capital intensity, 
i.e. the relative amount of capital required to generate sales, can also be conveyed by the asset 
turnover ratio. In sum, these arguments suggest a number of ways in which asset turnover can 
have an important relation to the spread.   
Quarterly financial statements, required by the Oslo Stock Exchange, lead to enhanced 
timeliness and quality of information released to financial markets. Moreover, a strict set of 
rules govern insider trading and insider information ensuring all investors trade based on 
equal information (Oslo Børs/Oslo Stock Exchange, 2010). These rules can affect the spread 
by easeing enforcement of debt contracts (section 2.4), and by increased liquidity of traded 
debt (Alexander et al., 2000). 
Ownership composition can also be related to the spread. The incentives of smaller 
shareholders to monitor management are limited by free-riding of other investors, because the 
individual owner covers the whole cost of monitoring, while receiving only a small share of 
the gains. In essence, the motivation to monitor is positively related to the individual 
investor’s stake in the firm. However, as shareholders become too dominant they can utilize 
their dominance to expropriate other stakeholders, creditors included (Hart, 1995). This line 
of reasoning seems to coincide with a bell-shaped curve, confirmed by Steen and Pedersen 
(2000) in relation to performance.  Anderson et al. (2004) argue that long-term owners, 
defined as owning a large share of the firm, will champion a longstanding perspective in the 
treatment of creditors, which may lead to not playing the games discussed in relation to the 
board of directors in part 2.4. However, this union is not supported by the empirical findings 
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of Bhorjraj and Sengupta (2003), who document a positive relation between the spread and 
the concentration of institutional ownership.  
Profitability is used by rating agencies as an overall measure of financial health. Return on 
assets measures the average return earned on the firm’s investments. In other words, the 
ability to put funds invested by creditors to profitable use within the firm, which makes this a 
highly relevant measure of profitability for creditors (Bodie et al., 2001).  
This part has so far related a number of firm characteristics to the default risk of bonds. I now 
investigate the extent to which default risk can account for the size of the spread, in order to 
form an opinion of the theoretically largest share of the spread to be captured by firm 
characteristics. By regressing the corporate spread on variables that should explain changes in 
default risk and recovery rates over time, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) explain a mere 25 
percent of changes in the spread. A high degree of cross-correlation, revealed by a closer look 
at the residuals, suggests a common underlying factor may be missing from their model.  
The low explanatory power of default risk is supported by Elton et al. (2001), who find that 
expected loss from default explains a mere 17.8 percent and tax differences explain an 
additional 36.1 percent, leaving 46.17 percent of the spread unexplained for 10 year A-rated 
bonds. The expected default premium is calculated assuming a risk neutral world using 
observed default probabilities, recovery rates and coupons.  
In an attempt to account for the 46 percent left unexplained, they argue that corporate bond 
spreads vary systematically with the same underlying factors as stocks. A risk premium in 
excess of expected default is thus required in order to induce investors to hold corporate 
bonds in a diversified portfolio. This systematic variation will only be captured by the risk 
premium if government bonds are insensitive to the very same systematic variations. These 
systematic variations can either be explained by changes in default rates varying with equity 
returns or some systematic underlying factor determining the compensation for risk in capital 
markets. Regressing the unexplained portion of the spread against the factors included in the 
Fama-French three factor model, explains 85 percent of the previously unexplained spread of 
industrial firms and reports significant relations of the market, size and value factors, which 
supports the hypothesis of systematic risk factors being priced in corporate bond markets.  
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Longstaff et al. (2005) describe how credit default swaps are an ideal method for measuring 
the size of the default premium by trading directly in the probability of default. Credit default 
swaps offer default protection in exchange for payment of a periodically fixed premium. In a 
default the protected investor receives par value of the debt in order to cover the loss on the 
underlying bond. They find that the default premium explains most of the corporate spread 
across all ratings, and the importance increases for lower rated issues, explaining 51 percent 
for AAA/AA-rated bonds, 56 percent for A-rated bonds and 71 percent of the spread for 
BBB-rated bonds.  
These figures are much larger than the share attributed to default risk by Elton et al. (2001), 
but are not directly comparable as the default swap premium will incorporate any systematic 
risk premium of corporate bonds. The total share of default risk and systematic risk in Elton et 
al. (2001) accounts for about 57 percent of the spread, and is thus in line with the results by 
the use of credit default swaps. These results imply that a significant part of the spread is 
unexplained by default risk, and consequently the firm characteristics discussed in this 
section. The next section discusses how bond and bond market characteristics can account for 
parts of the share left unexplained by default risk.  
 
2.2 Bond and bond market characteristics 
Bond characteristics, together with firm characteristics, form the backbone of any attempt to 
estimate a regression model of the bond spread. In an effort to explain the unexplained share 
of the bond spread, Longstaff et al. (2005) regressed the residuals of their model against 
several proxies of liquidity and tax effects. In contrast to Elton et al. (2001), they found a 
weak relation to variables representing the tax burden of bonds. If trading in corporate bonds 
is less liquid than trading in government bonds, one would expect a liquidity premium to 
compensate investors for the difficulty of selling corporate bonds. Proxies for liquidity, like 
the bid ask spread and size of the issue, are found to be important for explaining the residual, 
which allowed them to conclude that investors are compensated for the cost of low liquidity. 
Chen et al. (2007) use the bid-ask spread, percentage of days with zero returns and a liquidity 
measure based on a paper by Lesmond et al. (1999) as proxies for the true liquidity, and find a 
positive and significant relationship to the bond spread, which increases in importance for 
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riskier bonds. In conclusion, the commonly used proxies of liquidity favour the view of 
liquidity being priced in corporate bond markets.  
Bonds listen on an organized marketplace are to a large extent subject to the same rules as 
listed firms with regard to disclosure requirements and insider trading (Oslo Børs/Oslo Stock 
Exchange, 2008). Being listed can also be related to liquidity as it will be easier to find a 
trading partner in an organized market (Oslo Alternative Bond Market, 2010). Both factors 
benefit investors, which may result  in a lower spread of listed bonds.   
Another issue to consider is the life of the bond, often captured by inclusion of either maturity 
or duration (definition of duration in section 4.2). The option model points to a rising spread 
as maturity increases, but these findings are not always reproduced by articles investigating 
the yield across maturities of corporate bonds (yield curve). For investment grade debt, 
researchers find an upward sloping yield curve (Fons, 1994)(Sarig and Warga, 1989). 
Researchers rationalise their findings by explaining how benefits of further increases in credit 
quality are limited compared to the loss in case of a downgrading. An upward sloping yield 
curve is thus explained by the aggregate probability of a downgrading increasing with the 
term of a loan (Helwege and Turner, 1999). 
Speculative grade debt has the possibility of increasing its standing with rating agencies, 
while the risk of further downgrading is limited. A downward sloping yield curve can emerge 
as the accumulated probability of an upgrading increase with maturity. Firms of lower risk 
may experience a hump-shaped curve if the short term is dominated by worsening prospects, 
while improvements prevail in the long-haul (Helwege and Turner, 1999). Empirical research 
on speculative grade debt has produced varying results. Fons (1994) and Sarig and Warga 
(1989) find a downward sloping yield curve. In contrast, Helwege and Turner (1999) 
document an upward sloping curve after isolating the effect of maturity by investigating 
bonds issued by the same firm on the same date, but with differing maturity. They argue that 
the studies which conclude with a negative or hump-shaped relationship have fallen prey to 
changing risk characteristics of issuers across maturities. Basically, safer firms issue long-
term bonds, while more risky firms are forced to rely on medium-term bonds.  A hump-
shaped or strictly downward sloping curve emerges as firms of higher maturity are required to 
pay a lower default premium.  
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Two types of options are commonly included in bond contracts. Adding a call option entitles 
management to redeem the bond prematurely at a specified call price. The bond will be called 
when the coupon is higher than market rates, which allows the firm to refinance the bond at a 
lower coupon. Opposite, investors will incur a loss when they are forced to invest at the lower 
market interest rate. Having the bond called is thus unfavourable to investors who will require 
compensation in the form of a higher bond spread (Bodie, 2001). 
The option to convert grants bondholders the right to exchange a bond into a predetermined 
amount of shares (conversion ratio). The profitability of exercising the option requires the 
stock price to increase relative to the conversion ratio. The option to convert enables creditors 
to take part in the value creation of the firm and accordingly lowers the required yield to 
maturity (Bodie, 2001). 
 
2.3 The board of directors 
A definition of the board of directors is a useful point of entry into a discussion of the relation 
of board characteristics to the bond spread. According to Fama and Jensen (1983), owners 
delegate the responsibility of internal control to the board of directors, who then assigns 
responsibility of the daily running of the firm to the management, but retains the power to 
hire, fire and compensate top-management and approve and monitor important decision 
within the firm. This hierarchy is essential to ensure separation of ownership and control. The 
directors’ role is of an agent safeguarding the interest of the owners, and is illustrated by 
Cadbury (2002) who concludes that directors “owe their duty to their shareholders”. 
Carter and Lorsch (2004) present three distinct activities common to most board of directors. 
Firstly, a minimum requirement of any board is to monitor the performance of the firm and its 
management by keeping a close eye on important business units and the financial reporting 
process.  Secondly, the board is the top-level decision maker in charge of strategic direction, 
acquisitions, CEO compensation and firing and hiring of top management.  Lastly, boards can 
offer advice to top-management in relation to the daily running of the company. The nature of 
this role depends on the expertise of the different board members. In any case, top-
management is not required to follow the board’s advice, still top-management and the board 
frequently compromise on important business decisions. These distinctive activities require 
the board to balance their approach, as a CEO kept at a short leash may find it advantageous 
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play his cards close to his chest, knowing how information shared may be used to oversee his 
performance (Bøhren and Strøm, 2005).  
 
2.4 Board of directors and corporate governance 
A number of definitions of corporate governance exist in business literature. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as “ways in which the supplier of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investments”, which focuses on all 
investors in a firm, thereby including bondholders. Others employ an even wider definition, 
defining corporate governance as a mechanism for making decisions not specified in an initial 
contract (Hart, 1995). Tirole (2001) utilises the stakeholder perspective when defining 
corporate governance as “the design of institutions that induce or force management to 
internalize the welfare of stakeholders”. This definition goes beyond investors, including 
natural stakeholders like suppliers, employees, customers and communities.   
All definitions cited above include creditors in corporate governance. Accordingly, a relation 
to the corporate bond spread is established as good corporate governance involves 
safeguarding the interests of bondholders. Board structure can affect the cost of debt by 
promoting good governance, and consequently reduce the adverse effect of the governance 
problems discussed below. The board is in charge of maintaining good corporate governance 
within the firm, illustrated by Cadbury (2002) who defines the board as being in centre of the 
firm’s governance system. The remainder of this sub-section deals with three important 
governance problems, how they affect creditors and how the board can mitigate these 
problems. 
The first governance problem involves an agency problem as owners cannot fully monitor 
management controlling the firm on their behalf. This structure allows management to diverge 
from profit maximization in order to consume expensive perks, reduce effort, lower risk 
taking, diversify  or build a larger than necessary organization (Brealey et al., 2006). These 
actions all go with benefits to management, but may reduce profits to owners. A board is thus 
expected to intervene on the owners’ behalf in order to reduce the risk of management 
diverging from profit maximization (Hart, 1995). Lowered profitability reduces the financial 
health of the firm and can thus by itself cause a loss to creditors (part 2.1).  In contrast, lower 
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risk taking or growth through diversification (part 2.1) may benefit creditors. In sum, the 
aggregate effect of attuning management and owner incentives is difficult to ascertain. 
Writing and monitoring of complicated covenants in order to protect creditor’s claim against 
the firm are costly (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A financial reporting process of high quality 
makes for a more hands off monitoring of the firm. However, if financial information cannot 
be trusted, creditors are forced to take on a more active and costly monitoring role to make 
sure the firm is in accordance with the lending agreement. An empirical example is offered by 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), who find evidence of management manipulating the financial 
statements in order to conform with accounting covenants. Such malpractice allows firms to 
continue operating when liqudation would have been more profitable to creditors. In addition, 
the true risk of the firm is unobservable to lenders, and they will therefore incur a loss if the 
firm proves to be of higher risk than suggested in the information at issue (Lu et al., 2010).  
The board of directors is responsible for the accuracy of the financial statement, and are also 
ultimately responsible for internal reporting and control (Carter and Lorsch, 2004). Easy 
access to timely and reliable information can affect spread as creditors, being fully aware of 
these expected costs, will require compensation through the interest rate (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In summary, the performance of the board can affect the accuracy of 
information released to the financial market, which are of high importance to the creditors’ 
ability to monitor the lending agreement.  
The next governance problem involves the relationship between creditors and management 
and/or owners. Imagine management of a firm at the brink of bankruptcy having two projects. 
The first strikes a good balance between risk and reward, but the reward, if successful, is 
barely enough to cover the claim of creditors. The second project, if successful, covers not 
only the claim of creditors, but also leaves a handsome profit to the owners. The caveat is the 
low probability of success making this a negative net present value project.  Any financially 
sound firm would discard the latter project in favour of the first. This is not necessarily the 
case with a distressed firm, where creditors reap most of the profit from the good project and 
at the same time covers the initial outlays in case of failure.  In summary, choosing the risky 
project is profitable to the owners, while creditors incur a loss, causing a wealth transfer from 
creditors to owners (Brealey et al., 2006). More generally, the increased value of the limited 
liability put option of section 2.1 induces owners to raise firm risk, which reduces the total 
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value of creditors’ claim against the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Delayed liquidation in 
case of default, increasing leverage, paying out large dividends and refusing to invest equity 
in distressed firms are other examples where value creating opportunities are forgone by 
owners.  
Creditors are aware of these incentives, and will include comprehensive covenants and require 
compensation for the expected loss and monitoring costs through the bond spread (Brealey et 
al., 2006). Boards are hired to serve the owners, and may have incentives to rubber stamp all 
proposals with a benefit to owners. Opposite, the directors may take a long term perspective, 
as this agency cost will be taken into account by future lenders (Brealey et al., 2006). It is, 
based on these examples, difficult to conclude on the relationship of board structure and risk 
shifting to the corporate bond spread. 
The remainder of this part discusses how board independence, diversity, experience and size 
can enable the board to mitigate the presented governance problems and improve their 
performance in relation to their director duties.  
 
2.5 Board Independence 
Carter and Lorsch (2004) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue how a predominantly 
independent board is essential to achieve proper separation of ownership and control. 
Drawing a line back to the three main tasks of any board (Dalton et al., 1998), a board 
dependent on top management will not be able to properly monitor performance and the 
financial reporting process, which may lower the profitability of the firm and increase the cost 
of enforcing compliance with debt contracts. Moreover, it is clear that a board, which merely 
ratify proposals from top management does not fulfil their role as top-level decision maker, 
and it is unlikely that an insider dominated board will be able to offer independent advice to 
top-management.  
The role of outside and inside directors is discussed in “Separation of ownership and control” 
by Fama and Jensen (1983). Insider directors have access to information about the 
performance of different business units and the inner workings of the organization that, if 
shared, can increase the quality of monitoring and decisions made by the board. Furthermore, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find an increased number of inside directors when a CEO 
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change is imminent. This is a result of the need to screen and expose potential candidates to 
top level decision making. Outside directors are essential as negotiators in conflicts between 
management and as impartial decision makers in matters burdened with owner-management 
agency problems. Cadbury (2002) is of the opinion that outside directors add vitality to the 
board and are needed for their “critical objectivity”. In accordance with this, Carter and 
Lorsch (2004) suggest balancing an independent board against the knowledge held by 
company and industry insiders. The optimal balance between knowledge and independence is 
to a large extent determined by firm and industry characteristics, which implies that a distinct 
equilibrium exists for every firm.   
Beasly (1996) finds support for a relation between share of outside board members and 
accounting fraud, Klein (2002) identifies a similar association to abnormal accruals and 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) observe a relation between outside directors and the frequency of 
management’s performance forecasts, which together suggest that board of director 
independence is an important determinant of financial reporting quality and possibly related 
to the cost of debt.  
Bøhren and Strøm (2005) find no relationship of director independence to market value of 
Norwegian firms and explain their findings by positing a negative relationship between board 
monitoring and the CEO’s willingness to share information. Intense monitoring of 
management will lead to management entrenchment as information shared will be utilized by 
the board to monitor management. They conclude that the costs and benefits of independence 
are optimally aligned for Norwegian boards, which may explain the absence of a relation to 
the spread. 
Bøhren and Strøm (2005) measure independence as the difference between average director 
and CEO tenure. A positive value implies that the average director was hired before the 
current CEO, entailing that these directors will be more independent of the current CEO. The 
literature investigating the effectiveness of boards usually examines each director to 
determine their relationship to the firm. An example is provided by Anderson et al. (2004), 
who define directors employed or retired and directors in an immediate family relation as 
insiders, while directors with an existing or potential future business relation to the firm are 
branded as affiliated directors. Classifying directors using detailed qualitative data can make 
for a more accurate classification. Still, the researcher will encounter missing information and 
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borderline cases, which require a good sense of judgement in order to reach correct 
conclusions. Whether a director will have a future relation to the firm, other than the 
directorship, is entirely subjective and contrasts to the mechanical nature of the measure 
employed by Bøhren and Strøm (2005).  
 
 
Hermalin and Weisback’s (1998) relation of CEO tenure to nomination of dependent directors 
The intuition underlying their measure of independence is based on a model by Hermalin and 
Weisback (1998). This model advocates a relation between the current CEO’s track-record 
and the ability to nominate dependent directors to the board. The CEO’s bargaining power 
will increase after reporting high performance over time, which enables nomination of 
directors who are more dependent on the CEO. The model relates time of service to 
performance by modelling a board that fires CEOs after a period of poor performance 
assuming that the board is able to find a better candidate. As a consequence, relative tenure of 
the board and the CEO is related to independence through the CEO’s bargaining position 
(figure above).  
More generally, Dalton et al. (1998) explain how a relation between the relative tenure 
independence measure and board monitoring materializes as directors will feel obligated 
towards the CEO who hired them in the first place. Factors affecting board monitoring of the 
financial reporting process is, as argued in section 2.4, the most probable cause of a relation 
between board structure and the cost of deb. In sum, these arguments present a strong case in 
favour of tenure independence being a more suitable measure in relation to creditors. 
Furthermore, Hermalin and Weisback (1998) explain how attempts to enforce a certain ratio 
of outside directors are bypassed by nominating directors who would easily be controlled by 
management. This argument short-circuits the logic of classifying directors with no ties to the 
firm as independent. Together these arguments point to a mechanical measure comparing 
board and CEO tenure for having beneficial attributes as a measure of independence 
compared to traditional criterions often employed in the literature. 
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The importance of director independence is established by Anderson et al. (2004), who find a 
negative relationship to the corporate bond spread, and Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), who 
relate the ratio of non-officers negatively to the bond spread. The relation to financial 
reporting suggests that this relation may be caused by enhanced quality of the financial 
reporting process, which again relates to the second governance problem in 2.4.  
The CEO who serves a dual role as a board member rises comparable issues. Norwegian 
CEOs are prohibited by law to serve as chairmen, nevertheless, the CEO can still serve as a 
regular board member (Bøhren and Strøm, 2005). This is different from most American 
studies, which often investigates the effects of a CEO when serving as the chairman of the 
board in addition to his executive duties. Carter and Lorsch (2004) claim that truly 
independent boards are only accomplished by prohibiting the CEO from serving as a director. 
Still, this independence comes at the cost of not having direct access to the experience and 
inside knowledge of the CEO.  
 
2.6 Board experience 
 The tie between experience and productivity in any occupation, including directors, need no 
further introduction (Avolio, 1990). However, finding suitable proxies for experience is 
difficult. I argue that average tenure, average age and average number of board positions of 
the directors have a relation to the experience of the board and the spread. Tenure is a two 
edged sword in relation to the corporate bond spread. On the one hand, tenure may proxy for 
experience. As time of service increases, directors will learn more about the workings of the 
firm, their duties as directors and they may improve their stance in negotiations and their 
ability to persuade top-management, which may lead to a lower corporate spread as average 
tenure increases. Anderson et al. (2004) use tenure as a proxy for experience and the ability to 
persuade management, but find, to the contrary of their expectations a positive relation to the 
cost of debt. Beasly (1996) argues in favour of experienced outside directors being more able 
to prevent accounting fraud through monitoring, after having found a relation between outside 
director tenure and the likelihood of financial statement fraud.  
Opposite, Carter and Lorsch (2004), point out how directors may become more emotionally 
attached to the firm and top-management as time of service increases and how boards of high 
24 
 
tenure can grow less effective by getting bogged down in the old ways of doing things. The 
presented arguments can explain the larger corporate bond spread observed by Anderson et al. 
(2004), and suggest changes are necessary from time to time. Moreover, Golden and Zajac 
(2001) demonstrate a hump-shaped relation of tenure to strategic change, after suggesting an 
initially positive relation as younger boards will have “a less rich information base” of which 
to base their decisions, while longer serving boards will be less inclined to change the 
established philosophy. 
While tenure is used as a proxy of the relationship between the corporate bond spread and 
firm specific experiences, average age can proxy for the overall experience of a director. Age 
is correlated with the number of years spent working, which may cause a relation between age 
and overall knowledge and business experience of directors (Anderson et al., 2004). 
Similarly, Golden and Zajac (2001) explain how the strong leadership skills required by 
complex organizations are developed with age. In spite of this, Carter and Lorsch (2004) 
argue that many directors of high age will experience business knowledge becoming dated 
and network of contacts becoming smaller, which can result in a negative relation to board 
efficiency.  
Average number of directorships held by the board members is a different measure of 
experience, relying on characteristics of the typical director having numerous directorships. 
Several arguments support the notion of number of directorships being a proxy for 
experience. Similarly to the arguments presented for tenure, different directorships may 
improve one’s knowledge about the industry and duties as a director. In other words, it is not 
only the time spent on a particular board, but also the total time spent serving as a board 
member. Secondly, many positions can be a consequence of directors having important 
qualities and experiences, which are advocated by Fama and Jensen (1983), who propose 
serving on multiple boards can be a result of superior performance on past directorships. 
Outside directors’ reputation and thus attractiveness in the market for directors depends on 
their performance as board members. Therefore, good directors, who should have a positive 
impact on the firm, are characterized by many directorships as a consequence of their high 
esteem.  
Unrelated to experience, the number of directorships may also proxy for the size of the 
director’s network. According to Bøhren and Strøm (2005), a director’s network functions as 
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a source of direct and indirect information from other organizations, and thus enables him to 
make better decisions and offer superior advice to management.  
Ferris et al. (2003) examined the opposite relation, by arguing in favour of such directors 
being overcommitted, which may reduce their effort and lower their monitoring quality. 
However, no evidence was found after regressing number of positions against performance 
and examining abnormal stock returns after appointing a director with many directorships. On 
the contrary, they found evidence of the alleged overcommitted directors being more likely to 
serve on board committees.  Such thorough testing, together with the finding of a positive 
relation to performance by Bøhren and Strøm (2005), contradicts the overcommitted 
hypothesis.  
This section has established a relation of director tenure, age and number of positions to board 
experience. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind how the relation of these variables 
may be very different in the sample, evident by the alternative hypotheses relating these 
variables, both positively and negatively, to the spread.  
 
2.7 Board diversity 
Board diversity is argued by Cadbury (2002) to be an important quality of an effective board, 
and he accordingly argues in favour of balancing the different attributes and experiences of 
directors appointed to corporate boards. Bøhren and Strøm (2007) interpret gender mix, 
number of board members, employee directors and age dispersion as being important for 
board diversity, and argue in favour of a relation between diversity and the board’s capability 
as a decision maker. In practise, however, they find an inconclusive relation of age dispersion 
and a negative relation of the remaining diversity proxies.  
A number of variables can indicate the level of diversity within a board.  Age variation 
signifies directors who are in different stages of their careers or have a different life 
experience which may cause distinct values and beliefs (Ireland et al. 1987). Carter and 
Lorsch (2004) stress the importance of asking long-serving directors to retire in order to make 
room for new members, by explaining how young directors are more in touch with current 
and developing consumer trends as well as having fresh ideas and perspectives important to 
the firm. The difference in seniority of board members can therefore indicate firms replacing 
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board members bringing in new blood to the board. Variation between board members can be 
captured by the use of standard deviation of age and tenure (Bøhren and Strøm, 2005).  
 
According to Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), gender diversity allows boards to examine 
a wider set of alternatives in order to solve difficult problems, which may lead to higher 
performance by expanding the perspective of the board (Bøhren and Strøm, 2007). In 
addition, boards mirroring the customers and employees enhance understanding of the market 
place (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008). The Norwegian Parliament enacted a law in 2005 
enforcing 40 percent share of female directors on boards of public companies. At the same 
time, the publicly listed firms of my sample had 13 percent female directors. If there is a 
limited pool of qualified candidates, as is argued by Carter and Lorsch (2004), limiting this 
pool further by enforcing a certain gender mix can have an adverse effect on the effectiveness 
of the board. This argument is strengthened further as a great many firms tapped the limited 
pool to raise their share of female directors after the law was enforced. To the contrary, an 
enforced ratio of female directors may also increase the pool of candidates considered for a 
directorship (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008). 
Using panel-data techniques on a director dataset from Spain, Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
(2008) find that a higher ratio of female board members increases the value of the firm higher. 
In contrast, Bøhren and Strøm (2007) identify a negative relationship to firm performance of 
Norwegian firms. Such differing results are common in the empirical literature analysing 
gender diversity, and explain the lack of consensus among researchers.  
In sum, I expected a negative relation to the diversity of tenure and age, while the presented 
arguments in relation to gender composition are more conflicting. No articles have to my 
knowledge investigated the relation of board diversity to the cost of debt, which makes it 
interesting to note the relevance of gender equality to the bond spread.   
 
2.8 Board size 
Various conflicting hypotheses have been raised regarding the relationship between board size 
and board monitoring. Cadbury (2002) argues in favour of a board sufficiently large to bring 
in a wide variety of knowledge and experience, while still being small enough to allow “true 
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discussion and debate between members”. Jensen (1993) explains how reprisals by CEOs of 
firms with larger boards may cause individual directors to be less likely to speak freely and 
naturally lead to boards more easily controlled by management 
Group dynamics from organizational behaviour research raises the possibility of a hump-
shaped relationship to board performance. Initially, adding a member increases work capacity 
and the ability to gather information. Larger groups, however, suffer from free-riding of 
individual members and less effective communication and interaction, accordingly lowering 
the incremental effect of appointing an additional director to the board. The organizational 
behaviour literature suggests every group has an optimal size depending on the objectives at 
hand.  A decision making unit, for instance a board, will typically reach its optimal size at a 
lower head-count, than a group whose goal is pure information gathering (Busch and Vanebo, 
2003).  
This is supported by Golden and Zajac (2001), who found evidence of a hump-shaped relation 
of board size to strategic changes of American hospitals.  In his study of accounting fraud, 
Beasly (1996) also analysed the effect of board size finding a positive relationship to the 
likelihood of accounting fraud, which supports the view that board size can affect the cost of 
debt through the quality of financial reporting. A number of papers investigate the 
relationship between market value and board size. Yermack (1996) finds a negative 
relationship to Tobin’s Q (market value to book value of assets). He relates his result to the 
execution of several board duties by finding evidence of smaller boards being more likely to 
fire the CEO after a period of poor performance and implementing performance related 
compensation packages. His results relate board size to the board’s ability to monitor 
management and thus establish a potential relation to the corporate bond spread. While 
Yermack studied large Fortune 500 companies, Eisenberg et al. (1998) confirmed the negative 
relationship on small and medium sized Finnish firms. This negative dependency is also 
confirmed by Bøhren and Strøm (2005) in their study of Norwegian firms.   
Regarding the corporate spread, Anderson et al. (2004) identify a negative relationship of 
board size to the spread, and interpret this as a link between board size and the quality of the 
financial reporting process. In conclusion, the results in relation to the spread seem to suggest 
a negative relation to board size. While both the performance literature and a study of 
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accounting fraud, which is argued to be highly relevant for the cost of debt, suggests an 
adverse effect of increased board size. 
3. The Norwegian bond market 
It is beneficial to start off with a general description of the Norwegian bond market to get a 
picture of the size as well as sector composition of issuers and investors over time. All bonds 
and certificates issued in the Norwegian market have been included in the discussion, in order 
to account for changing characteristics of all sectors and return types in the Norwegian 
market.  
 
Figure 2: End year par value of outstanding Norwegian bonds and certificates in billion 2009 kroner. Source: 
Stamdata 
Figure 2 highlights the almost fourfold increase in volume outstanding during the last ten 
years. Even so, the Norwegian bond market is small compared to comparable countries. A 
comparison to Sweden is illustrative as the Swedish bond market is more than twice the size 
of the Norwegian market, evident by the par value of outstanding bonds and certificates in 
December 2009 of 3884 billion NOK.  
Furthermore, the figure illustrates how different sectors’ share changes over time. It is 
interesting to note the dominance of state, banks and other financials in the primary bond 
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market, accounting for 25, 20 and 31 percent of the total par value of outstanding at the end of 
2009. In 2002 these figures were 37, 37 and 9 percent respectively, illustrating the large 
increase in bond market activity by financials. Investigated further, the increase can primarily 
be attributed to the popularity of mortgage companies after the new covered bond regulation 
was introduced in 2007. The new regulation allowed banks to remove mortgages from their 
balance sheets, and establish covered bond companies to finance these mortgages in the bond 
market using the very same bonds as security (Norwegian government, 2007).  
The smaller share issued by the state is a clear sign of the increased scope of firms using the 
bond market to satisfy their financial needs.  The increased attractiveness of the Norwegian 
bond market is also evident by noting the increased volumes by foreign organizations. The 
sector labelled “other private” includes industries such as oil and gas, manufacturing, fishery 
and shipping, and has remained relatively stable in the period from 2001 to 2010 compared to 
other sectors, increasing from 53 to 159 billion in nominal amounts and decreasing from 14 to 
10 percent measured as share of total par value of bonds outstanding. 
The term structure reveals a small number of long-term bonds, which exposes investors 
having long term liabilities to a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities 
(International Monetary Fund, 2005). This also makes calculation of a duration equivalent 
synthetic government bond in part 4.2 impossible at high maturities, which causes a 
measurement error to the bond spread if the yield curve is positively or negatively sloped at 
long maturities. The International Monetary Fund thus recommends issuance of long-term 
government bonds in order to create a liquid market for safe long-term investments. 
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Figure 3: Share of bonds owned based on market value Source: Finance Norway (2007) 
The Norwegian corporate bond market is dominated by large institutional investors who hold 
the bonds until maturity. Examples include insurance companies and pension funds holding 
32 and 14 percent of the outstanding bonds, respectively, in 2007. Insurance companies invest 
in bonds because they have long-term liabilities more easily matched by investing in long-
term bonds (Finance Norway, 2007). Banks primarily invest in bonds to satisfy their liquidity 
needs by using the safer spectre of bonds as collateral in transactions with the central bank 
(Finance Norway, 2007). Moreover, a sizeable 23 percent of bonds are held by foreign 
investors. 
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Figure 4: Number of corporate bonds issued in the Norwegian market across time 
According to figure 4 the number of bonds issued per year was relatively low prior to 2002. In 
2002, the number of bonds increased abruptly and stabilized at about 1000 new bonds issued 
per year in the following 5 years.  The increase in 2002 was mainly due to a sharp increase in 
fixed coupon bonds, while floating rate notes remained relatively stable. The financial crisis 
in 2008 and 2009 led to a sharp decline, which crippled this relatively stable pattern. A 
continuation of this downward trend could result in about 530 new issues in 2010, which is 
substantially lower than in 2009, and would as such prolong the negative trend.  The figure 
indicates how a relatively small share of bonds included in my sample was issued prior to 
2002, while a relatively large portion was issued between 2003 and 2007.  
The Norwegian government has a net financial surplus and is for this reason a net investor in 
the financial markets. Nevertheless, government bonds are issued every second year to 
maintain a risk free reference rate in the Norwegian financial market (The Norwegian Central 
Bank, 2004). A reference rate is important to enable market participants to gauge the risk 
premium offered on corporate bonds. This is commonly expected to enhance the efficiency of 
financial markets. Nevertheless, borrowings of the Norwegian government are small 
measured relative to other countries (The Norwegian Central Bank, 2004). The low liquidity 
and volumes outstanding may cause the balance of demand and supply to affect the yield in a 
way that is unrelated to the level of risk free lending in the economy (Rakkestad and Hein, 
2004), and can thus lower the suitability of using the yield of Norwegian government bonds 
as a risk free reference rate for corporate bonds. A measurement error in a dependent variable 
has to be correlated with the independent variables to cause undesired results in an OLS-
regression model (Wooldridge, 2009). It is difficult to argue in favour of systematic 
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correlation between the error and the independent variables, which makes it highly unlikely 
that this problem, if it exists at all, affects the estimated relationships in section 7.  
The use of Norwegian government bonds as a reference rate has two advantages relative to 
American bonds used in most studies of corporate bonds. First, the American dollar is a 
global reserve currency, which may affect the yield of US government bonds as central banks 
around the world hold large amounts of dollar (Reisen, 2009). One illustrative example is the 
large holdings of American government bonds by the People’s Republic of China (Helmut, 
2009). Second, the spread of American bond markets includes a tax wedge as government 
bonds are tax exempt at the federal level, while corporate bonds are taxable at all levels (Elton 
et al., 2001). In comparison, the tax effect is removed from the Norwegian corporate bond 
spread as all Norwegian bonds are taxed at the same rate.   
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4. Data collection 
 
4.1 Sample size 
 Norwegian trustee (Stamdata) 
maintains a comprehensive 
database from which all data on 
bonds, such as date of issue, 
maturity, return type, issue size 
and whether the bond is listed on 
an organized market, is collected. 
Stamdata contained 13463 bonds 
at the beginning of 2010, and 
table 2 describes how the sample 
ended up at 1341 viable bonds. 
According to the table, bonds issued prior to 1998 and bonds issued by foreign enterprises are 
removed as the corresponding firm and board data proved difficult to collect. Bonds issued or 
guaranteed by the government are risk free. These bonds are removed from the sample due to 
the irrelevance of estimating a risk premium.  
As shown, the initial sample included 4218 bonds issued by savings banks, which would have 
dominated the sample of bonds if included. Furthermore savings banks are either independent 
institutions or issuers of primary capital certificates, which limit the influence of investors and 
give them a very different organizational structure compared to other firms included in the 
sample (The Norwegian Savings Banks Association, 2010).  
Mortgage companies and covered bond companies issue bonds to finance portfolios of 
household and commercial mortgages. Many of these firms are shell companies growing 
assets by approximately 1000 percent annually from 2006 to 2008, as banks have been eager 
to transfer mortgages off their balance sheets. These large changes cause extreme values that 
may adversely affect the estimated coefficients of the regression models (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Further concern is caused by how default risk may be solely determined by the riskiness of 
the underlying mortgages, which leaves no place to the firm variables employed by my 
Table 2 Removed Sample size 
  Bonds in Stamdata   13463 
- Before 1998 977 12486 
- Government related 4048 8438 
- Savings banks 4253 4185 
- Foreign firms 851 3334 
- "Exotic" return types 432 2902 
- Maturity < 0.5 years 1164 1738 
- Missing coupon 71 1667 
- Various issues with data 73 1594 
- Mortgage companies 253 1341 
= Total bonds in sample   1341 
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models (Campbell and Taklser, 2003). I thus remove mortgage companies from the 
regressions in order to improve the estimated relations to important characteristics of the firm.   
Other bonds, labelled exotic return types in table 2, have special features making calculation 
of the spread difficult. To be specific, the return of linked notes is tied to equity returns which 
make calculation of the spread unachievable at issue, and information about the discount at 
issue of zero coupon bonds is unavailable through the data sources at my disposal.   
Intuitively, the probability of default in the case of very short-term bonds is low (Bodie et al., 
2001) and may reduce these bonds’ sensitivity to any factors used to explain the cost of debt. 
A large share of the bonds is considered to be within in this category, and would, if included, 
have a large say in determining the estimated relations. Motivated by this, bonds with 
maturity of less than 6 months are removed from the sample. Finally, after removing all 
deadwood, the sample contains 1341 floating and fixed rate bonds with a maturity of more 
than or equal to 6 months.  
 
4.2 Calculation of the spread 
It is useful to start out with a description of duration and yield to maturity, which are 
important concepts to investors in debt instruments and play a crucial part in 
determining the spread.  
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The yield to maturity, often abbreviated to yield, is the return earned by investors if the bond 
is bought today and held until maturity. Technically, the calculation involves finding the 
discount rate equalizing future cash flows received to the current price paid for the bond, 
which is the result of solving for y in the above equation. The probability of bankruptcy will 
be incorporated into the yield to compensate the investors for the risk of default (Bodie et al. 
2001).  
Yield to maturity assumes the bond is held until maturity. Bonds with a call option attached 
can be redeemed prematurely, which may invalidate the yield to maturity as a measure of the 
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return over the bond’s life. Yield to call is an alternate measure taking into account the 
possibility of early redemption by replacing the life of the bond with the time to the first call 
date. The yield to call is a more suitable measure if low market interest rates make early 
redemption profitable to the firm (Bodie et al. 2001). 
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Duration measures the effective maturity of a bond by taking coupon payments into account 
(Bodie et al. 2001), and is calculated as the weighted average time to each bond payment. 
According to the formula above, the weights are determined by the ratio of discounted cash 
flows at time t relative to the price of the bond today. Expected duration is lower for callable 
bonds as they risk being redeemed prior to the due date.   
Modified duration is measured as the above duration discounted by the yield to maturity of 
the underlying bond, and measures the approximate change in the bond price in relation to a 
one percentage point change to the market interest rates. A bond with a larger modified 
duration will for this reason respond more negatively to changes in interest rates (Bodie et al. 
2001).  
Duration is determined by several factors (Bodie et al. 2001). A lengthened maturity will 
naturally increase duration as repayment is more distant in time, while a higher coupon rate 
will lower duration because of a reduced average maturity of the cash flows, and thus reduce 
duration. Lastly, duration is negatively related to the current yield to maturity.  
 
My sample consists of two return types. For floating rate notes, interest is calculated based on 
the sum of a market interest rate and a spread. Since the interest rate will move according to 
market rates, these instruments are free of any risk of market rates changing relative to the 
coupon rate. Fixed rate bonds pay a fixed coupon, exposing investors to interest rate risk, as 
market rates change relative to the promised coupons. The different exposures to interest rate 
changes will not in theory affect the spread, because fixed rate notes are matched to a duration 
equivalent bond meaning they will have the same exposure to interest rate changes (assuming 
equal convexity).  Investors in both types of bonds will experience a loss (gain) as default risk 
increases (decreases) (Bodie et al. 2001).  
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The spread on fixed and floating rate notes are calculated using different methods. The former 
is estimated by subtracting the yield on a synthetic duration equivalent government bond, 
calculated using linear interpolation of the yield curve, from the corporate bond coupon.  
Using linear interpolation assumes the yield curve is linear between the two closest matching 
bonds. The government bond yield is calculated as the average yield during the 30 days prior 
to the bond issue. The use of the coupon rate in place of the yield to maturity is justifiable as 
no bonds in a comprehensive spot check were found to be issued at a discount from par value.  
The spread on floating rate notes relative to the Norwegian Inter Bank Offered Rate (NIBOR), 
which is a money market interest rate for lending among Norwegian banks (The Norwegian 
Central Bank, 2010), is available directly from Stamdata. The Stamdata spread measures the 
risk premium in excess of risky interbank lending (Hull, 2009), which would make direct 
comparison of floating and fixed coupon bonds impossible. The Stamdata spread was made 
compatible with the fixed coupon spread by adding to it the difference between NIBOR and 
Norwegian treasury bills. Ideally, I would have preferred to measure the floating rate note 
spread relative to an equal floating rate government bond. However, this is a purely 
hypothetical issue as no such bonds are issued by the Norwegian government.  
Yield to call is often the most relevant measure of the yield on callable bonds. Disregarding 
yield to call can cause a measurement error of the spread on callable bonds. However, this 
measurement error is reduced as call options are commonly out of the money at issue (Bodie, 
2001). Still, it is useful to keep in mind that any systematic measurement error will be 
captured by any callable bond dummy variable included. 
The yield to maturity and modified duration of government bonds and treasury bills are 
collected from Datastream and the Norwegian central bank, respectively. The spread of bonds 
denominated in foreign currencies are calculated against the yield on government bonds 
issued by the respective countries. For the sake of simplicity, I matched bonds issued in 
Swedish krona and USD by maturity, while bonds denominated in Euro are duration matched 
to German bonds. The yield to maturity of these bonds is collected from the web-pages of the 
respective central banks.  
Extracting the yield to maturity from secondary bond markets is the predominant method of 
analysing the corporate bond spread. Sadly, the number of observations through time are 
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limited by the average bond being traded a low 10 times a year (Oslo Stock Exchange, 2009). 
This figure is sure to overstate actual liquidity as trades are not evenly spread across either 
bonds or time.  Secondly, a lion’s share of bonds is not listed causing a 60 percent reduction 
to the number of viable bonds. The sample being cut in more than half will severely reduce 
the power of the hypothesis tests (Wooldridge, 2009). One can, moreover, argue that the yield 
at issue is the cost at which the company raised the debt to begin with, and therefore better 
measures the cost of debt (Gabbi and Sironi, 2002).  
Still, the use of primary market spreads introduces problems of its own. As presented above, 
estimates of how the spread relates to firm characteristics over time for the same bond are 
made impossible. Further problems, discussed in part 6, are caused by estimating a model 
using cross-sectional variation among bonds. Moreover, the primary market spread will also 
absorb any under- or miss-pricing of bonds at issue. However, Datta et al. (1997) find that 
next day abnormal return of straight bond IPOs are positive, but insignificant and conclude 
that underpricing in corporate debt markets is weaker than what is observed in equity IPOs.   
 
4.3 Firm characteristics 
This sub-section presents the way which the characteristics of a firm discussed in section 2.1 
are measured, collected and matched to the bonds, in order to attain a better understanding of 
the nature of the variables included in the estimated regression models. A comprehensive list 
of all variables and how they are measured is included in table A4.  
 
Annual financial accounting data is collected from RavnInfo, and is matched to bonds based 
on year of issue. Financial statements are usually released some time into the next year, which 
means investors would not have had access to the actual financial statement at the time of 
issue. This problem, however, is minor as information about the state of the firm would have 
been partially available through other sources. The financial statements of 2009 and 2010 are 
not available, and many bonds issued in this period are accordingly matched to the financial 
statement of 2008. Variables measured in kroner are reported in December 2009 kroner.  
The magnitude of change over time of variables based on the financial statement causes a 
number of problems. When variables, such as sales or total assets, grow by a factor of 1000 
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annually, past accounting data is made irrelevant within a year. Extreme values are also 
common among the accounting based variables, as a negative return on assets of -3 or a 
positive return on assets of 1 can attest to. Overall, the effect of extreme values is uncertain, 
as they can have a very large impact on the estimated coefficients, but may also enhance my 
ability to estimate significant results through increased variation of the independent variables 
(Wooldridge, 2009).   
 =     !!! 
Return on assets was chosen as the preferable measure of firm profitability, because of the 
lower degree of extreme values in my sample and by being a highly relevant measure of 
profitable for investors (section 2.1). The numerator is defined as net income before minority 
interests and extraordinary items, and the denominator as total assets at year end. The 
calculations of the other financial ratios, presented below, are self-explanatory.  
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Figure 5: Volatility of the individual industries measured relative to average sample volatility 
 
According to Campbell and Taksler (2003), equity volatility is the preferable measure of risk. 
However, I am forced to rely on accounting based measure of risk because the removal of 
bonds issued by private firms would cut my sample in more than half, which would hamper 
with my ability to estimate significant relations to other variables (Wooldridge, 2009), thus 
forcing me to rely on accounting based measures of risk. Figure 5 plots how asset based 
volatility would rank banks as the most risky industry. My sample banks have experienced 
high growth in assets, and derived from this a high standard deviation of total assets unrelated 
to firm risk. Asset return volatility leads to a more reasonable distribution of risk among 
firms, and is consequently the preferred measure of risk in my sample. Return on assets varies 
substantially from period to period, which suggests using all available financial statements to 
estimate a more stable measure of risk.   
One challenge is the difference between group and parent company accounts brought about by 
the fact that group accounts are unavailable prior to 2004. The integration of subsidiaries into 
group accounts causes total asset to be larger than what is reported in the parent company 
accounts (Kvaal and Johnsen, 1999). A shift from parent company to group accounts over 
time may make it seem like the firm experienced very high growth, despite being artificially 
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caused by including the assets of subsidiaries. Even though I would like to utilize the 
additional information provided by subsidiaries, consistency over time requires me to use total 
assets of the parent companies accounts. This is not the case for ratios, as both the nominator 
and denominator will increase as subsidiaries are included. Ratios, such as return on asset, 
asset return volatility and asset turnover, are accordingly calculated based on group accounts 
whenever available, in order to get an overall picture of the state of all firms controlled by the 
issuer.  
My ownership data comes from Proff.no, which has the most comprehensive source of current 
ownership data on Norwegian firms. Under the assumption of current ownership patterns 
being representative of the past, I generated a variable representing the share held by block 
holders, who are owners’ holding more than 5 percent of the firm.   
The division into different industries is based on the industry classification reported in the 
bond dataset from Stamdata. A number of industries, such as shipping, property and banking, 
include firms operating in relatively similar markets. Others are more heterogeneous, like the 
industry category, which includes firms ranging from shipyards to pharmaceuticals, or oil and 
gas, which includes extraction of oil, drilling companies and firms offering seismic services. 
An effort was made to create as homogenous industries as possible. To be specific, I 
reclassified several firms from the diverse service category to more appropriate industries, and 
included the two bonds issued by insurance companies in the financial sector.  
I constructed a dummy variable representing the five industries having the highest level of 
risk, ranked by the asset return volatility of figure 5, for use in the descriptive analysis of 
section 5. The high risk industry dummy is 1 for firms in fishery, industry, oil and gas, 
shipping and telecom/it and 0 for the remaining industries. Many firms within these sectors 
are export based and therefore exposed to international competition and price fluctuations, 
while the low risk sectors contains many firms serving domestic markets.  
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4.4 Board structure 
The discussion of the four board characteristics produced a number of proxies of the board 
structure. The collection of data and the choices made with regard to the estimation of these 
variables are all presented in the following paragraphs.  
I collected information on name, date of taking office and type of position of the directors 
from the firm’s public notices announcing changes to board composition, which are accessible 
from the Brønnøysund Register Centre dating back to 1999. Combining the data from the 
public notices with data on date of birth and other positions in official business life, available 
from RavnInfo and Proff.no, enabled me to generate variables representing the number of 
directors, share of female directors, average and the standard deviation of age and tenure of 
the directors and average number of directorships held by the members of the board. Alternate 
directors are excluded from these calculations as they are assumed to be of less importance to 
the structure of the board. For the sake of consistency, I follow Anderson et al. (2001) by 
using the natural logarithm of board size. For the about 100 bonds issued by firms having 
filed no public notice of board composition at the time of issue, I used the next available 
observation by assuming the board was the same at issue, but calculation of tenure was made 
impossible without information on the time of taking office.  
Indentifying the correct director in the Proff.no database proved challenging, and there are 
bound to be errors where I found the wrong person. Both data sources are also limited to 
current positions, which force me to assume that a director’s positions today are 
representative of the positions held in the past. The Proff.no database contains information on 
all current directors. Directors missing in the database are consequently recorded as having no 
current positions. Moreover, I was prevented from indentifying the correct person whenever 
the database returned many viable persons. These directors are missing data on age and 
positions in business life, and are thus removed from the calculation of average age and 
positions of the board.  
Not having had access to information on directors who served prior to my bond sample causes 
all directors to start at zero tenure regardless of having served prior to 1999. The end result is 
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a measurement error that is more pronounced for bonds issued during the first half of the 
sample and materializes as a steady increase in tenure with time before stabilizing after 2004. 
Luckily, this problem is reduced by a lion’s share of bonds being issued during this latter 
period. 
"(-( =  1  %%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I calculated two variables to represent the independence of a board. The first variable 
measures independence as director tenure relative to CEO tenure as shown in the formula 
above, and has been analysed in the theoretical discussion of independence. An alternative 
measure calculates the ratio of directors hired before the current CEO, where a larger ratio 
means a more independent board. I also computed a dummy variable representing whether or 
not the CEO serves as a director. The information about the CEOs required to compute these 
variables are available from the firm’s public notice announcements. However, this piece of 
information is missing for about half of my sample, which causes the removal of these bonds 
from all models with the independence variables.   
5. Descriptive statistics  
 
I next review the spread in light of several important bond characteristics, such as time, 
maturity and return type, in order to offer a preliminary discussion of the structure and the 
expected relations of the regression model. At the end I present a descriptive analysis of the 
different explanatory variables and their correlations to other variables. 
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5.1 The distribution of bonds 
 
Figure 6: Number of bonds issued by industry in sample  
Investigating the distribution across industries, my sample is dominated by banks and oil and 
gas, issuing about 35 and 12 percent of bonds, respectively. Industries dominating the sample 
can affect the estimated relations to the spread and distort my overall inference. The banking 
sector is an illustrative example, by having a median firm size of 29 billion compared to the 
sample median of 6.56, which can affect the estimated relation to firm size in the complete 
sample.  
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Figure 7: Number of bonds in the sample issued at different maturities (less than) 
Figure 7 illustrates the importance of estimating separate regression for short- and medium-
term bonds in order to investigate how the large share of short-term bonds may influence the 
estimated coefficients.  Visual inspection of the graph also portrays the criticism forwarded by 
the International Monetary Fund as only 12 bonds are have a maturity of more than 10 years.  
The remainder of bonds have a maturity of between 1 and 5 years.  
 
5.2 The corporate bond spread 
As shown in table A5, the average spread is 189 basis points, while the median is 94 basis 
points. This wedge between the median and the average is caused by some very risky firms 
required by markets to pay a spread of more than 1000 basis points. The standard deviation of 
243 is an indication of variation in the spread beyond the extremes reported above, which is 
advantageous when estimating relations to the spread using OLS-regression (Wooldridge, 
2009).  
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Figure 8: Spread in basis points across industries 
The overview of the average spread across industries, in figure 8, offers no surprises. The 
high spread industries are dominated by the export sector, whose profitability is tied to 
changing prices of commodities in global markets. It is also interesting to note the similar 
sequencing of firms whether they are ordered by the bond spread in figure 8 or return 
volatility in figure 5. The banking sector, being heavily regulated, commands the lowest 
spread in the sample. Energy and utility and food and beverages serve basic needs in domestic 
markets and are thus awarded with a low spread. In conclusion, the large sector differences 
highlight the importance of controlling for the distinctive attributes of the industries in the 
estimated models. 
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Figure 9: Bond spread (basis points) over time (left) and share of low risk industries share off bonds (right). Shaded 
areas represent recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (2010). 
 
Over time the blue line, representing the spread, seems to follow the business cycle, falling in 
downturns and rising sharply when the economy is booming. This is opposite of what I would 
expect if the spread is determined by default risk (Bodie, 2001). The natural explanation is 
one of shifts to the risk composition of firms issuing bonds, where riskier firms issue bonds in 
good times, while avoiding the bond market in downturns. Thus, reducing the spread as the 
compositions of bonds is tilted in favour of safer bonds.  
To strengthen my theory I added the share issued by firms from low risk industries (blue line), 
based on the high risk industry dummy variable defined in section 4.3. By visual inspection 
one can see the share of low risk issues following the business cycle, and as the percentage of 
safer issues fall the average spread rises. In sum, the dynamics of this graph supports the 
hypothesis of riskier firms withdrawing from the bond market in downturns.   
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Figure 10: Bond spread (basis points) across maturities (left) and the share of low risk industries (right) 
 
Motivated by the discussion in part 2.2, I expect long-term bonds to be dominated by safer 
firms. In turn, this may result in a decreasing or hump-shaped curve across maturity. The blue 
line exhibits a clear hump-shape, initially increasing, before falling almost linearly for 
maturities of more than 2 years. The shape of the curve emphasises the estimation of a non-
linear relation, by the use of a quadratic term, to best capture changes in the spread.   
In order to account for the behaviour of the spread over maturities, I added the share of bonds 
issued by firms in low risk industries (red line). Maturities of less than one year are dominated 
by safer firms evident by their 90 percent share of bonds issued. Intuitively, only firms in 
safer industries are able to rely on short-term bonds to satisfy their liquidity needs. Risky 
firm’s share is higher for maturities ranging from 2 till about 5 years, but slides downwards as 
maturity increases. This can be explained by only safer firms being able to issue long term 
bonds at good terms, while more risky firms are forced to rely on medium-term bonds 
(Helwege and Turner, 1999). Looking back at the changes in the average spread across 
maturities, one can see how changes to the composition of issues explain a substantial portion 
of the variation in figure 10.   
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Figure 11: Spreads across maturity for high and low risk industries 
Figure 11 plots the average spread separately for high and low risk industries across 
maturities. The curves show how the bond spread expands for both groups as maturity is 
lengthened from less than a year to about three years. At longer maturities the red curve 
depicts a falling spread, creating a hump-shape over time, while the low risk curve depicts a 
flatter relation. Even after dividing the sample by risk, the firms within the high risk industries 
segment themselves into different maturities based on risk characteristics. Alternatively, the 
low number of observations for long-term high risk industry bonds may add to the hump-
shape by causing these average spreads to be less accurately calculated. This pattern does not 
transfer to the low risk industries and may be accounted for by the more homogenous nature 
of the markets served by banks and property firms.  
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Figure 12: Number of bonds issued of return types across maturity 
 
Figure 13: Spread of return types across maturity 
There are few differences between floating rate notes and fixed coupon bonds over industries 
and time. However, a slight difference materializes over maturities as illustrated in figure 12 
and 13. Short term bonds are usually fixed, which is perfectly logical given the low interest 
rate risk for short-term bonds, while medium-term bonds have a slight over representation of 
floating rate notes. The average spread also differs across maturity, as the spread increase in 
figure 12 of medium-term bonds is higher for fixed rate bonds. This can, in a fashion similar 
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to the changes over time and maturities, be explained by a higher share of fixed coupon bonds 
issued by firms from high risk industries. Some of the difference over maturity will inevitably 
be captured by the firm characteristics controlled for in the regression, but these graphs still 
propose including return type in the regression model.  
 
5.3 Bond characteristics 
As shown in table A5, the average amount borrowed is 297 million kroner, while the median 
is 201 million kroner. Some bonds are very large, for instance the eight largest bonds all have 
a face value of more than 2 billion NOK, and the largest has a par value of 15 billion kroner. 
Still, most issues are much smaller, illustrated by 50 percent of bonds being in the range of 
108 and 337 million kroner.  
The median maturity is 1.2 years and 25 percent of the bonds have a maturity of less than 9 
months, which illustrates how a large share of bonds is relatively short-termed. The 
distribution of return types consists of 37 percent floating rate notes and 63 percent fixed 
coupon bonds. Furthermore, 5 percent are convertibles, 18 percent of the bonds are callable 
and about 41 percent of the bonds are listed.  
 
5.4 Firm characteristics 
The sample characteristics are to a large extent determined by the industries documented to 
dominate the sample at the beginning of this section. The firms of these industries issue many 
bonds annually causing them to have large say when the sample statistics are determined. This 
problem is illustrated as the bonds issued by the largest firms are all banks. The median firm 
size is 6.8 billion NOK, while the average is 29.8, which demonstrates how the banks’ large 
balance sheets cause the average to be more than 4 times the size of the median.   
The average firm is able to generate 0.38 kroner of sales per 1 kroner invested in the firm. 
Grocery trade and producers of food dominate at the higher end of the scale, while banks and 
financial institutions are found to have lower asset turnover. The large differences across 
industries support the notion presented in 2.1 of asset turnover representing industry 
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characteristics. The low median profitability of 1 percent may be an indication of how my 
sample firms are either start-ups running at a temporary loss or mature unprofitable firms.   
 Variation in the estimated coefficients is an advantage in order to estimate significant 
coefficients in regression models (Wooldridge, 2009). The low degree of variation of leverage 
and intangible asset is thus a cause of concern, evident by 26 percent and 48 percent of bonds 
having insignificant levels of the ratios, respectively. Still, a handful bonds sparks a high ratio 
of both variables alleviating some of this concern. Nevertheless, low variation can be an 
explanation of a weak relation of these variables to the spread.   
 
5.5 Board structure 
 
The average age of 51.4 years illustrates how people are appointed to the board at a late stage 
of their careers. As for tenure, the average board has served as directors for 2.7 years. 
However, the average of 3 years after 2004 is due to the measurement error of board tenure 
(part 4.3) a more representative description of my sample directors. 
My median board, being 7 directors, is much smaller than what is analysed in most studies of 
corporate boards, and can lead to a disparate relation of board size compared to other studies. 
This is evident by the median board size of 12 directors in Anderson et al.’s (2004) study of 
S&P 500 firms, which makes my third quartile board of 8 members seems small in 
comparison.  
Approximately 60 percent of CEOs of large American industrials serve as chairmen of the 
board (Boone et al. 2007). In my sample only 35 percent of CEOs serve a dual role as 
directors, which is an indication of a higher degree of independence in Norwegian 
boardrooms. This may provide for a very different board environment to test the alleged 
benefits independent directors. The seniority of directors and CEOs are about the same as the 
average of relative tenure independence is -0.09 years.  Still, a lot of variation is present 
among the different bonds, which the maximum and minimum of 8.63 and -6.41, respectively, 
can attest to. Investigating the share of independent directors reveals that many boards have 
either all or no independent directors, while a smaller sub sample has a mix of independent 
and dependent directors.  
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5.5 Correlation  
Studying the correlation matrices, in table A6 and A7 in the appendix, is useful in order to 
determine the relationships between the corporate spread and important variables, and may as 
such give an indication to what variables should be included in the regression model. The 
former table shows firm and bond characteristics, while the latter reports the correlation of 
firm and board variables. The corporate bond spread is significantly and positively correlated 
to maturity, intangible asset ratio, volatility and leverage, inferring that these variables should 
be included in a regression model. In contrast, return on assets, block-holders and total assets 
are negatively correlated. Of the dummy variables callable, convertible, floating rate notes, 
listed bond and firm are all significantly related to the spread. Amount issued and asset 
turnover, however, have an insignificant correlation coefficient to the spread at the 5 percent 
level, but can nevertheless have an important role once other factors are controlled for.  
Of the board variables, average tenure, average age, number of board members and CEO 
serving as a director, all have a significant negative correlation to the spread, while average 
number of directorships, tenure dispersion, independence and share of female directors have 
an insignificant coefficient. These results highlight some relevant relationships between cost 
of debt and board characteristics, but correcting for bond and firm variables is necessary 
before a conclusion can be made. 
It is also useful to study the relationship between some of the independent variables more 
closely. A positive correlation of maturity indicates that the correlation coefficient captures 
the rise in the spread from short- to medium-term bonds depicted in figure 10. Furthermore, 
high leverage is associated with higher return on assets and smaller firms. For bond 
characteristics, the correlation matrix indicates a tendency for larger firms to be less likely to 
issue callable, convertible and listed bonds, and riskier firms are more likely to add a call 
option and the ability to convert a bond into stocks.  
For board characteristics, the matrix shows that members of larger boards keep their seats 
over a longer period. Moreover, the correlation coefficients indicate how large boards appoint 
directors with a lower number of directorships.  Equally enlightening is the correlation 
between board and firm characteristics. A high average tenure seems to go hand in hand with 
more profitable and less risky firms. The correlation matrix also reports a negative association 
between board size and leverage and return volatility, while an opposite association is found 
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to firm profitability. High levels of independence and the share hired before the current CEO 
seems to be characteristics of lower levels of debt.  
The correlations documented above emphasise the importance of controlling for firm 
variables, because dropping these variables from the regression may lead to biased estimates 
of the board coefficients, as discussed in the next part (Wooldridge, 2009).  
 
6. Empirical methodology 
I now consider the statistical properties of OLS-regression in relation to my sample of bonds, 
as a prelude to the estimation and analysis of the multiple regression models in the next part. 
“Introductory econometrics a modern approach” by Wooldridge (2009) is used as a reference 
throughout this discussion. 
My data set, having surveyed multiple bonds issued by the same firm over time, has some 
features of a panel data set. However, a perfect panel data set would involve observations of 
each firm periodically. Bond issues, however, are not a periodical event. Some firms routinely 
issue bonds at an annual basis, while others use bond markets at a more sporadic basis. These 
latter firms can thus have large gaps in the time dimension of the data set.  
The limitation of my dataset forces me to disregards the time-dimension by adding all bonds 
into one large cross-sectional sample. This method is called the pooled cross-sectional 
approach, and is not without flaws. To be specific, the same factors may affect bonds issued 
by the same firm over time, and consequently violate the assumption of different bonds being 
independently distributed. Researchers routinely solve this problem by the inclusion of time 
dummy variables in order to incorporate systematic relations of the spread over time.  
The discussion of the correlation matrices documented substantial correlation between the 
individual proxies of the board structure and firm characteristics, and stresses the need to 
control for other factors related to the spread in order to uncover the true relation of board 
structure. This requirement promotes the use of multiple regression models, which enables the 
estimation of board structure coefficients holding all other relevant factors constant. The most 
viable estimation method is ordinary least square (OLS), because this is the best linear 
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unbiased estimator (BLUE). More technically, BLUE means that the estimates will have an 
expected value equal to the true value in the population (unbiased) and have the smallest 
variance (best) of any linear estimator 
OLS is BLUE if the five Gauss-Markov assumptions are satisfied. The assumption of constant 
expected error given any values of the independent variables (fourth Gauss-Markov 
assumption) fails when one or more of the explanatory variables are correlated with the error 
term of the regression. Failure of this assumption is called endogeneity or endogenous 
explanatory variable in relation to a specific variable, and often occurs when an important 
unobserved variable is missing from the model. Important missing variables will be contained 
within the error term, and do not by themselves violate the BLUE characteristics of OLS. 
However, if the missing factor is correlated with the independent variables the result is biased 
estimates as parts of this variable will be captured by the independent variables. This 
correlation between the error term and independent variables violates the constant expected 
error assumption and thus leads to an endogeneity problem.  
An illustration of this problem is offered by Kale and Shahrur (2007), who find evidence of 
the bargaining power of customers being positively related to debt levels. Bargaining power 
of customers is not accounted for by the dataset and may be reflected in the bond spread by 
creditors. If this is the case, the effect of bargaining power will be partially captured by the 
leverage coefficient and partially by the error term, and thus mislead me to assume an 
artificially high importance of leverage.  The problem arises even after including industry 
dummies, because they represent broad industry characteristics, and will not be able to 
capture the finer distinctive features of the numerous sub-markets within the assigned industry 
classifications.  
An endogeneity problem can also originate by the use of the wrong specification of 
independent variables, such as using book values of assets in place of market value or asset 
return volatility in place of equity volatility. This will cause the relation of firm size to differ 
from the true relation, and can, assuming true firm value is correlated with the other 
independent variables, lead to biased estimates of all included coefficients.  
Simultaneity, a special kind of endogeneity, may cause problems in regression models when 
one or more of the independent variables are jointly determined with the dependent variable. 
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For instance, a two way relationship may exist between the amount of leverage and the 
spread. A high spread will reduce the attractiveness of using debt as a mean of finance and 
will accordingly lower the leverage ratio. At the same time, a higher amount of debt may 
increase the risk of the firm, and consequently affect the spread. This example is best 
described as a simultaneously determined equilibrium.  
Will OLS be an unbiased estimator if the explanatory variables are jointly determined with 
the dependent variable? According to Wooldridge, a simultaneously determined dependent 
variable may cause an endogeneity problem by being correlated with the error term. An 
equally serious problem is caused by the difficulty of separating the effect of leverage on the 
cost of debt, which we are interested in, from the effect of the spread on leverage. The well 
know dilemma “which came first, the chicken or the egg”, is a suitable description of this 
problem. The remedy is to estimate simultaneous equation models, where the co-determined 
variables are estimated together. However, these models will be biased if one or more of the 
equations are miss-specified consequently requiring a more rigorous theoretical description of 
the nature of the simultaneity than what is available in the relation between firm, bond, board 
characteristics and the spread.   
Missing observations result in the removal of approximately 100 bonds from the regression 
models. Missing data causes no problem if the observations are missing at random. However, 
a violation of the random sampling assumption (second Gauss-Markov) may occur if the 
missing bonds have a systematic cause. The bonds missing one or more variables are caused 
by no previous accounting records or missing information about the board in the company 
registers. The latter is common for start-ups and may cause problems if these firms are 
perceived to be more risky by investors. The problem is partially solved by making an effort 
to fill in the blanks, whenever possible.  
The fifth Gauss-Markov assumption requires the same variance of the error given any values 
of the explanatory variables. This assumption is, in addition to being required for OLS to be 
BLUE, important in order to calculate the standard errors of the estimated coefficients. 
Violation of this assumption is called heteroskedasticity and causes a bias to the estimator of 
the variance of the coefficients. Violation thus invalidates hypothesis testing and causes the t-
statistics to no longer conform to an exact t-distribution.  
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A second assumption in order to test hypotheses requires knowledge of the full distribution of 
the coefficients, which is made possible by assuming the unobservable error is normally 
distributed. This assumption is valid if all independent variables are normally distributed. 
Total assets and issue size are both log-transformed in order to more closely match the bell-
shape of the normal distribution. Most ratios deviates substantially from this requirement, but 
can be overlooked by using the central limit theory. This loophole causes the OLS-estimator 
to be approximately normally distributed regardless of the distribution of the individual 
variables, and is only viable in large samples, commonly defined as consisting of more than 
30 observations.  
It is problematic to assume independence of multiple bonds issued by the same firms. This 
problem is aggravated by the frequent bond issues carried out by a small minority of firms. 
This may result in correlated residuals, which can invalidate the regular OLS standard errors. 
The problem is solved by estimating standard errors that relax the assumption of the 
independence of individual bonds. All reported hypothesis tests on the coefficients have been 
adjusted for this problem by estimating firm clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2006).  
 Standardizing the coefficients is a useful tool to judge the relative importance of different 
variables included in a regression. This is done by standardizing each variable by subtracting 
its mean and dividing by its standard deviation, which results in each variable having a mean 
of 0 and standard deviation of 1. The new coefficients are interpreted as the change in 
standard deviations to the spread by an increase to the independent variable by one standard 
deviation. 
7. Results and analysis 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The remainder of my thesis discusses the estimated relations of bond, firm and the four board 
characteristics to the corporate bond spread. The models in table 3 include firm and bond 
variables from section 2.1 and 2.2 found to have a significant relationship to the corporate 
bond spread. Insignificant variables, except the convertible dummy variable, are removed in 
order to estimate a parsimonious base model as a building block for investigating relations to 
the board structure.  The variables found to be insignificant are included in table A9 of the 
57 
 
appendix, and are discussed at the end of section 7.1 and 7.2. Board variables, found to be 
insignificant are included in the models and discussed in the main text, as an inconclusive 
result is important when documenting the hypotheses presented in part 2.  
Even thought my sample consists of bonds issued after 1997, a number of important 
accounting variables are missing from RavnInfo in 1998 and 1999. The 40 bonds issued 
before 2000 are thus removed from the regressions. As discussed earlier, I control for the 
effect of time and industries by the use of dummy variables. Industries containing few bonds 
or firms having few common characteristics are included in the base category.  
Firms related to the Norwegian businessman Olav Thon are removed from regression 4 to 
estimate the relation of the number of directorships held by the board. Olav Thon born in 
1923, has more than 100 positions in different firms and owns a number of firms having 
issued 89 bonds in the sample. These factors will produce extreme outliers of average age, age 
dispersion and number of positions, which may make estimation of relations to the spread 
difficult.  
Table 3 reports four regressions in order to test different proxies and maximize the effective 
sample size. The latter is important in order to take into account the fact that the independence 
variables are missing for a relatively large share of the sample. Including these variables in all 
regressions would impair on my ability to estimate significant relations to other variables 
(Wooldridge, 2009). Regression 1 includes diversity measured relative to tenure and 
experienced measured using average tenure, while regression number 2 measures diversity as 
dispersion in age and experience as average age. Regression 3 adds the independence variable 
and the dummy variable of whether the CEO is a director. The inclusion of these variables 
reduces the sample to 979 observations. The last regression removes the 89 bonds issued by 
firms related to Olav Thon, and is used to estimate a relation to number of board positions and 
as a robustness check of the coefficients representing average age and age dispersion. 
Coefficients are reported with cluster corrected t-statistics below them in parentheses, and 
the stars represent the significance level at which one can reject the null hypothesis of no 
relationship to the bond spread.  
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7.2 Hypotheses and expected relationships 
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I hypothesis, based on the discussion in part two, that board independence will have a positive 
effect on the monitoring of the board, which points to a negative relation to the bond spread. 
Next, I expect increased experience to have a positive impact on the quality of the board, and 
consequently anticipate a negative relation of average board tenure, age and number of 
directorships held in business life. The discussion with regard to diversity left me with the 
expectation of a negative relation of tenure and age dispersion, while the relation to gender 
dispersion is more vague. Conflicting results of board size on performance, financial 
accounting quality and the cost of debt makes pinpointing an expected relationship difficult. 
The correlation matrix seems to point to a negative relation of board size, tenure and age 
diversity, but controlling for other variables is necessary before a conclusion can be made.  
 
The relation of the firm characteristics is more straightforward. I expect a negative relation of 
leverage and firm size and a positive relation of profitability. I was unable to find sources 
enabling me to pinpoint the relation of asset turnover, which prevents me from concluding on 
the expected sign. The theoretical discussion and description of the spread over maturities, 
strongly suggest a hump-shaped relation of maturity to the spread. Furthermore, I expect a 
negative relation of issue size, listed bonds and bonds being convertible, while a positive 
relation is expected to callable bonds.   
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Table 3 - OLS-regression of bond spread (bp) 
    Sign 1 2 3 4 
F
ir
m
 c
h
a
r.
 
Asset return  volatility + 186.92*** 173.53*** 203.53*** 180.25*** 
2.91 2.6 3.27 2.72 
Asset Turnover ? -70.91*** -77.67*** -76.27*** -81.87*** 
-3.13 -3.66 -3.07 -3.54 
ln(Total Assets) - -18.22** -22.24*** -20.24* -20.06** 
-1.97 -2.6 -1.78 -2.37 
B
o
n
d
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
Maturity + 35.54*** 36.47*** 35.37*** 35.96*** 
4.69 4.94 3.93 4.77 
Maturity^2 - -3.13*** -3.16*** -3.17*** -3.07*** 
-4.12 -4.44 -3.21 -4.39 
Callable + 121.75*** 118.13*** 120.48*** 112.84*** 
5.75 5.32 4.70 5.10 
Convertible - -61.04 -56.15 -95.01** -54.94 
  
-1.61 -1.49 -2.00 -1.47 
ln(Amount Issued) - -28.38** -24.72** -31.38** -26.52** 
    -2.46 -2.13 -2.52 -2.21 
B
o
a
rd
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
ln(Board Size) ? 46.05 58.52** 51.1 61.25* 
 
1.6 1.99 1.44 1.91 
Average Tenure - -25.21*** -23.45*** 
 
-3.55 -2.75 
Average Age - -4.51*** -4.21*** 
 
-2.88 -2.65 
Multiple Directorships - -0.22 1.88 -1.01 4.51*** 
 
-0.22 1.51 -0.9 2.93 
Average share female  ? -49.13 -31.13 -78.3 -49.97 
 
-1.07 -0.79 -1.46 -1.17 
Std Tenure ? 16.98 23.59 
 
1.34 1.64 
Std Age ? -1.6 2.36 
 
-1.12 1.09 
Independence - 3.79 
 
0.88 
Dual pos CEO ? -14.15 
 
-0.6 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
 0.6485  0.6471  0.6653 0.6493 
  N   1170 1206 979 1118 
Bond spread in basis points. Asset volatility and asset turnover as fractions 
Callable, convertible and Dual pos CEO as dummy variables 
Sign represents the relationships discussed in section 2. 
Constant, year and industry dummy variables are included, but not reported in this table 
*, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Reported t-values and significance levels are estimated using firm clustered standard errors 
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7.2 Firm characteristics 
 
 Long term debt to total assets, argued to be important in part 2.1, is not significant at the 10 
percent level in table A9. The lack of significance means it is very likely to observe such a 
coefficient, even if leverage is irrelevant. The result is robust to alternative measures of 
leverage, such as total debt to total assets and total debt to equity.  
The trade of theory and the pecking order of finance offer two distinct explanations of the 
weak relation of leverage. According to the trade of theory of the capital structure, firms will 
choose an optimal mix of debt and equity by weighting the positive and negative effects of 
debt on equity value (Brealey et al., 2006). Benefits of debt include tax deductibility of 
interest payments and the disciplinary effect of fixed interest payments on management. 
Opposite, direct and indirect costs of default cause firms to prefer lower leverage. These costs 
and benefits are taken into account by management when they decide upon an optimal ratio of 
debt. In the model, however, many of these factors are left unexplained and thus reside within 
the error term. Specifically, a firm, whose assets are easily marketable in a distress sale may 
settle on a higher ratio of debt than a similar firm relying on its valuable brand name, and may 
at the same time be required to pay a higher cost of debt (Brealey et al., 2006). Another 
example relies on how true firm risk is negatively related to leverage levels and positively 
related to the spread (Brealey et al., 2006). External observers are confined to use estimates of 
risk based on externally available data, while management on the other hand can rely on 
detailed inside knowledge as they choose an optimal level of debt. These examples are at the 
heart of the problem as they show how marketability of assets in distress or true firm risk will 
be partially captured by the error term and partially captured by leverage.  This causes an 
endogeneity problem, and may, in both cases, bias the expected positive relation towards zero.  
 The pecking order of finance describes how asymmetric information of investors and 
management causes firms to prefer internal to external sources of finance and debt to equity 
(Brealey et al., 2006). These preferences lead to the leverage ratio being determined by the 
firm’s external need of finance, which in turn is determined by access to internal funds and 
the investment opportunities available. This causes firms to settle on a low level of leverage 
regardless of their underlying business risk. Low levels of debt are often assumed to have a 
small effect on default risk (Brealey et al., 2006), and can thus explain the weak relation of 
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leverage. The pecking order and the trade of theory are not compatible, as the latter involves 
an optimal level of debt. Alternatively, the weak relation can also be due to a miss 
specification of the leverage ratio. It is probable that the true relationship involves debt 
measured relative to market capital (section 5). 
Adding an interactive relationship of leverage and return volatility, in order to investigate 
alternative leverage specifications, resulted in a positive coefficient of 478 basis points. 
Coefficients on interactions terms are more difficult to interpret, and will also affect the 
standalone interpretation of return volatility and leverage.  
The interaction term in table A8 is estimated relative to the average level of return volatility 
and leverage (Wooldridge, 2006). The estimated relation indicates how higher leverage makes 
for a more negative relation of firm risk. This is in line with the empirical findings of 
Campbell and Taksler (2003), who rationalise their findings by explaining how risky firms 
with small amount of debt are less likely to go bankrupt, while high leverage and risk makes 
for an especially destructive combination. Testing the significance of volatility under the new 
specification involves using an F-test of joint significance of the interaction and the regular 
coefficient. This test signifies that both factors are strongly significantly different from zero 
(F-test 3 in table A16). However, the interaction term do not seem to augment the statistical 
importance of leverage, evident by the insignificant F-test at the 10 percent level (F-test 4 in 
table A17).  
Even though this interaction term has an intuitive explanation, the benefit has to be weighed 
against the cost of a more complicated interpretation of the model. Furthermore, the 
interaction term proved to be a dead-end in relation to the chief motivation of trying out an 
alternative specification of leverage.  I thus decided to leave out this interaction term of the 
final model.  The discussion of leverage has introduced two theories of the capital structure in 
order to explain the absent relation of leverage. Still, to reach a conclusion on the most 
appropriate explanation is difficult, except to note that both explanations are plausible.  
Turning to the significant firm variables, the importance of the coefficients can be judged by 
comparing the standardized coefficients. The standardized coefficients indicate how a one 
standard deviation change in asset turnover, total assets and return volatility results in a 
change of -0.19, -0.12 and 0.1 standard deviations, respectively,  to the spread.  
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Asset turnover is the most important firm variable, judged by the size of the standardized 
coefficients and by the highly statistically significant coefficient. It is, however, difficult to 
trace the negative sign to specific characteristics of firms, such as capital intensity or 
marketing strategy. Firm size, measured as log-transformed total assets, is the second most 
important firm predictor of the spread, and is significant at the 5 percent level in model 1, 
which supports the argument of larger firms being more robust in times of crisis.   
Asset return volatility has the expected positive sign and is highly statistically significant. 
However, the variable seems to be of relatively low importance being ranked last of all by the 
standardized coefficients. This rank is caused by a very low practical significance, 
exemplified by a low 6.9 basis points increase to the spread as return risk is increased from 
the first to the third quartile. Furthermore, the practical importance is not heightened by the 
interaction term of leverage and volatility. This is not in accordance with the findings of 
Campbell et al. (2003) in relation to equity volatility, and may suggest that return volatility is 
an inferior measure of firm risk. Campbell et al.’s (2003) argument is based on the way which 
equity volatility incorporates information continuously. In contrast, new information is taken 
into account by the financial statement at an annual basis. Even so, the low share of bonds 
issued by publicly listed firms force me to make do with return volatility (4.3).  
Leverage is not the only insignificant firm variable. Table A9 indicates how return on asset 
has a non significant relation to the spread. Looking back at the large share of firms that 
report a low or negative return on assets may provide a rational for this weak relation (part 
5.4). Investors who believe in the future potential of a firm may perceive a current negative 
return on assets as irrelevant when they decide whether or not to invest in a bond. In other 
word, return on assets may not represent an adequate measure of the financial health of many 
firms.  
The intangibles assets ratio proved insignificant. This can be attributed to the artificially low 
levels of intangibles assets in the sample caused by the shortcomings of financial accounting 
measures of intangible assets. Specifically, the financial statement leaves out important 
intangible assets, such as brand name and the human capital of employees, severely biasing 
the estimated ratio downwards (Kvaal and Johnsen, 1999). Lastly, the share of the firms held 
by block-holders proved unable to explain the corporate bond spread.  
63 
 
The accounting based variables surprised me with their low importance as measures of default 
risk.  These findings are not as surprising when one look back at the 17.8 and 56 percent of 
the spread related to default risk, respectively, in the articles by Elton et al. (2001) and 
Longstaff et al. (2005). These figures leave a significant share of the spread to other factors 
than default risk. I investigate further by comparing my estimated coefficients to studies 
conducted on American data. Using leverage as an example, Anderson et al. (2004) find only 
a weakly significant relation of leverage to the spread. In relation to total assets, Anderson et 
al. (2004) and Klock et al. (2005) report coefficients of 10 to 22.5 (depending on the model 
specification) and 30 respectively, which are relatively similar to my coefficients of between 
18 and 22. In conclusion, my estimated coefficients seem to be relatively similar in size to the 
results of other authors.  
 
7.3 Bond characteristics 
Considering bond characteristics, investors require a sizeable addition to the spread for bonds 
being callable. This is as anticipated in light of the expected loss to investors when a bond is 
called by the firm. Alternatively, Crabbe and Helwege (1994) review three agency theories 
and find empirical evidence explaining how more risky firms are more likely to include a call-
provision. The coefficient will thus capture unobservable risk characteristics important to 
management when they decide whether or not to include the option to call a bond. These 
characteristics may be captured by the callable dummy variable, which in turn would lead to 
an upward bias to the size of coefficient.  The significant relation of issue size is in line with 
the argument that larger bonds have more potential buyers and sellers, which increases 
liquidity. 
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Figure 14: Shape of the curve relating maturity to the spread in regression 1 in table 3 
The decision to use a non-linear relationship of maturity complicates the interpretation of the 
coefficients, because the effect of a one year increase in maturity depends on the initial 
maturity (Wooldridge, 2009). Figure 14 shows the diminishing effect of maturity to the 
corporate spread brought about by the coefficients of regression 1. The diminishing nature of 
the curve illustrates how a one year increase to the term of a short-term bond increases the 
spread to a lesser extent than a comparable one year increase of a medium-term bond. The 
diminishing effect of including a squared term to the regression will dominate at some point, 
and will eventually cause a negative effect of a one year increase to the term of the loan. The 
former happens at a maturity of about 6 years, while the latter occurs at approximately 12 
years. However, most bonds are within the range of a positive marginal effect of a lengthened 
maturity. In conclusion, the emerging hump-shaped relation is in accordance with the finding 
of many studies, and can be attributed to risk characteristics not controlled for by the other 
firm variables (Helwege and Turner, 1999). 
A predicted negative coefficient is estimated in table 3 to bonds with a convertibility option. 
However, the estimated p-value is not small enough to warrant a conclusion in favour of a 
lower spread. Nevertheless, the theoretical justification of a lower spread on convertibles 
bonds is strong enough to warrant inclusion in the base model. The model is also incapable of 
documenting a systematic spread difference of floating rate notes and fixed coupon bonds in 
table A9.  
It is interesting to note how a listing on a stock exchange of both the firm and the bond do not 
significantly affect the spread. The arguments in 2.1 and 2.2 theorized how increased quality 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
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and equal information of investors would work to lower the spread. The long-term perspective 
and dominance among investors by pension funds and insurance companies may help to 
explain my inconclusive result (part 3). Planning to hold the bonds until maturity, these 
important investors are less sensitive to the benefits cited above. More generally, it is also 
possible that the value to all investors of higher quality information is severely reduced as low 
liquidity makes trading more difficult (part 4.2).  
 
7.4 Board independence 
The remainder of this thesis discusses the relation found to variables representing the board 
structure. The relation of board independence, measured as the difference of average director 
and CEO tenure, is not able to predict the level of the corporate bond spread (regression 3). 
Moreover, an identical conclusion is obtained after the inclusion of the dummy variable 
representing CEOs who serve a dual role as board members. These results indicate that the 
conclusion of Bøhren and Strøm (2005) is applicable to bond markets as well as equity 
markets.  
The above independence measure contains information of relative tenure of the board and the 
CEO, which if irrelevant, complicates the interpretation of independence. In comparison, the 
ratio of independent directors is simpler, being determined by whether or not the directors 
were hired before the current CEO. However, my conclusion remains the same, justified by 
the equally insignificant coefficient of table A8.  
My results contrast to the findings of a number of articles investigating the effect of board 
independence on board effectiveness, cost of debt and firm performance. In the following I 
present two possible explanations of my findings.  
Firstly, comparing the tenure of directors and the CEO may be a poor method to account for 
director independence. Directors hired by former CEOs may be close personal friends of top-
management, while directors hired under the reign of the current CEO may have no prior 
relationship to the firm. Another example involves how poor performance may force a change 
of CEO (James and Soref, 1981), which substantially changes the measure of independence, 
and simultaneously may cause a change to the corporate bond spread. In other words, 
independence may capture the underlying causes of a CEO dismissal.  
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Secondly, the discussion of part 2.5 revealed how the structure of Norwegian boards is by 
nature more independent from management than comparable American boards. The 
inconclusive results can thus be attributed to an optimal level of independence of Norwegian 
boards, while the boards studied in Anderson et al. (2004) would benefit from becoming less 
dependent on management.  Bøhren and Strøm (2005) concluded in favour of the latter 
explanations after estimating a similar relation to performance. Still, I find it difficult to reject 
the former hypothesis, and will thus limit myself to note how both hypotheses are plausible 
explanations of the inconclusive relation of director independence.  
 
7.5 Board experience 
The theoretical discussion promotes director tenure, age and number of directorships as 
proxies of board experience. The case for tenure is supported by the strongly negative 
coefficient of regression 1. Part 5.5 discussed how average tenure is artificially low and 
increases steadily during the first half of the sample, before stabilizing after 2005. This may 
influence the estimated relation cited above. I thus include a separate regression of bonds 
issued after 2005 in table A11, which confirms the findings of table 3. 
It is natural to add a quadratic term in order to investigate the hypotheses forwarded in favour 
of a stronger initial benefit of tenure and a negative relation of high seniority boards (part 
2.5). The quadratic term is reported in table A8 and is judged to be highly significant by the 
F-test in table A16. A positive squared term supports the argument of a decreasing importance 
of tenure at higher seniority.  Still, the small size of the squared term limits the deviation from 
a non-linear relation within the range of tenure observations in my sample.  
On the other hand, infrequent changes to the board can be related to mature firms. If mature 
firms can raise debt at better conditions, the mature firm effect will be contained within the 
tenure coefficient, seemingly increasing the importance of tenure. This view is supported by 
Boone et al. (2007), who studied the determinants of board characteristics and found evidence 
of changes to board composition and size as firm characteristics evolved. The referred to 
changes will lower average tenure as directors are replaced and may also be related to the 
spread, which, together, may induce a negative effect of low tenure.  
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My conclusion contrasts to Anderson et al. (2004), and supports their initial argument of 
tenure having a negative relation to the cost of debt through experience. These results need 
not contradict each other if boards at the average tenure of my sample of 3 years (2004-2010) 
are able to harness the benefits of experience, while boards having served for 9.2 years, as is 
the case of  Anderson et al.’s(2004) sample, are dominated by the adverse effects of tenure 
discussed in part 2.6.  
Age, representing life long experience, is included in regression 2. The coefficient gives an 
account of a positive dependency of strong statistical properties. However, some may argue 
that this result alone is not strong support of the experience hypothesis, as people appointed to 
the board are already relatively old, justified by the median director being about 51 years old. 
Even though people learn throughout their lifetime, the effect of the 26th working year can be 
argued to be less than that of the 5th year (Avolio, 1990). Still, the result is more compelling 
once paired with the negative relation of tenure.  
Age and tenure have been argued to cause higher experience. Number of directorships, 
however, is argued to be an indicator of directors who have qualities and experiences related 
to their performance as directors. Model 4 is estimated after removal of firms affiliated with 
Olav Thon and documents a significantly positive connection to the bond spread of average 
number of board positions. This result favours the over-committed hypothesis to the 
hypothesis of board positions representing positive qualities of the individual directors. My 
finding is the opposite of Ferris et al. (2003) and Bøhren and Strøm (2005) relative to firm 
performance, and implies a somewhat different relation to the cost of debt.  
Part 4.4 explained how the number of directorships of bonds issued during the late part of the 
sample is more accurately measured, as only data as of February 2010 was available through 
Proff.no and RavnInfo. Using this variable, I assume the average director who has many 
positions today also had multiple positions at issue. The validity of this assumption is 
examined by dividing the sample into two sub-samples by time (regression 4 in table A11). 
The relation is highly significant in the sub-sample including 2005, which is most prone to 
this measurement error, while an insignificant coefficient is reported for more recent bonds. 
By itself, this can invalidate the assumption and point to oddities in the sample as 
explanations of the positive relation. However, observed over time the number of 
directorships fluctuates around the sample average, which points to no systematic changes 
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caused by the measurement error. Still, the relationship being determined by the sub-sample 
most affected by the measurement error suggests a cautious approach when interpreting the 
positive coefficient of average number of directorships.  
The similar coefficients on average age and tenure signal the value and importance of 
experience. The opposite sign on average number of positions do not by itself discredit this 
hypothesis as it is likely that other factors than experience form this relation. These variables 
are only used as proxies of experience, and the relationships found can consequently not be 
tied directly to increased experience. They do, however, together present a sound argument 
for the experience hypothesis.  
 
7.6 Board diversity 
The few articles which discusses board diversity presents dispersion in gender composition, 
tenure and age as possible aspects of diversity. The presented models in columns 1 and 2 
convey little evidence of these coefficients being different from zero. My results are 
accordingly not consistent with the argument that replacing directors bring new vigour to the 
board nor the claim of directors of different age having complementary knowledge and 
experience. My weak results can be caused by the standard deviation of tenure and age being 
poor proxies of diversity. A shakeup of the board may occur after a change to corporate 
control or a period of poor performance (Denis and Sarin, 1998), which by themselves may 
affect the spread. Large changes to the board will by definition cause a reduction in the 
calculated standard deviation of tenure, and this shows how the standard deviation of tenure 
may capture other aspects of the firm than diversity.  
I presented two conflicting hypotheses of the relation to the share of female directors. One 
relates female directors positively to the bond spread by arguing how limiting the pool of 
viable candidates may affect director quality. The other presents an opposite relation by 
arguing how female directors expand the perspective of the board. Neither is supported by the 
negative, but insignificant coefficient reported in both models. My results are estimated in a 
period when firms hired female directors to comply with the new law. This variation in the 
sample makes a good environment to investigate the relation of female directors, and thus 
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supports the notion of female directors being no different from male directors in the eyes of 
creditors.  
 
7.7 Board size 
As motivated in part 2.8, the number of directors can represent a number of characteristics of 
a board. Both work capacity and diversity increases with the number of directors, while a 
negative relation to the board’s effectiveness and influence is argued for large boards.   
Log-transformed board size is positive in all reported models in table 3. However, the strength 
of this relationship is sensitive to the choice of model specification. Model 2 reports a 
significant coefficient at the five percent level, which is support of board size having an 
adverse effect on the bond spread.  Opposite, a p-value of 0.111 in model 1 do not qualify to 
reject the hypothesis of the true coefficient being equal to zero. It is interesting to note how 
the coefficient of model 1 is significant once estimated on the sub-sample of fixed coupon 
bonds and weakly significant on non-financial industries and after removal of multiple bonds 
issued by the same firm annually. These results indicate a stronger relation of board size 
within the sub-samples than in the sample as a whole.  
An alternative model specification involves a quadratic term in order to test the hump-shaped 
relationship presented in organizational psychology research. Regression 1 in table A8 in the 
appendix reports insignificant coefficients on both number of directors and number of 
directors squared. However, an F-test is required to maintain the joint irrelevance of two 
coefficients. The reported F-test in table A16 is not able to reject the null of both coefficients 
being different from zero. Moreover, the quadratic model is one of diminishing increases to 
the corporate bond spread when new directors are added to the board. In other words, an 
increase from 2 to 3 directors is more negative to creditors than an expansion from 9 to 10 
members. This is the opposite of the arguments presented in the literature, and it is 
accordingly hard to base a logical explanation on this result. It is clearly not hump-shaped 
within the interval of board sizes found in my sample, which strongly supports discarding the 
non-linear model.  
Explaining the mixed results is difficult. For one, it is possible that the true relationship is one 
of increasing spread for larger boards, where my mixed results can be attributed to low 
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variation in the sample or a miss-specification of model 1. The former has some substance as 
my sample firms usually keep their board size constant through time. Although my sample 
consists of many bonds, the variation of firms issuing bonds is not equally large. A larger and 
more varied sample may have enabled me to conclude with statistical certainty on the relation 
of board size (Wooldridge, 2009). Moreover, correlation of board size to a number of 
variables in the models may also be a cause of the mixed results (part 5.5) (Wooldridge, 
2009). Still, there is the possibility of a non-existent or weak relation, either due to board size 
being irrelevant to creditors or many boards having an optimal number of board members. 
The last has some weight in light of my median and third quartile board being 6 and 8 
members, respectively, which means most board are smaller than the maximum effective 
board size stipulated by Lipton and Lorsch (1992).  
The negative to the spread of Anderson et al.’s (2004) contradicts the estimated coefficient of 
model 2. Their study is conducted on larger American firms, and it is therefore questionable 
how their results compare to my smaller Norwegian firms. The negative relation to 
performance in Bøhren and Strøm’s (2005) study of Norwegian firms makes for a more 
relevant assessment of my findings. More generally, arguments presented by organizational 
behaviour research and participants in the governance debate makes for a compelling case in 
favour of board size having a negative relation to board performance. These arguments solve 
the deadlock between the two models by providing a theoretical explanation of my results and 
evidence of a positive relation to performance of Norwegian firms. I thus adopt the significant 
coefficient of model 2, and accordingly concludes in favour of an adverse relation of board 
size to the cost of debt.  
 
7.8 Robustness in sub-samples 
Dividing the sample into different sub-samples assesses the stability of relations found in the 
models of table 3. This is made important as my sample includes a large share of banks and is 
collected during a time of high growth of the domestic bond market. As discussed earlier, the 
size of the t-statistics depend on the sample size (Wooldridge, 2009), which reduces the 
power of the hypothesis tests in these sub-sample regressions. Coefficients not being 
significant in the sub-samples are therefore not very disturbing. In contrast, significant 
changes of sign are more problematic, as they violate the interpretations of my results and 
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indicate a relation sensitive to the characteristics of the different sub-samples. The sub-sample 
regressions are included in tables A11 to A15 of the appendix. I will start out by a discussion 
of bond and firm variables, before I comment on the behaviour of some important board 
variables. 
Tables A11 to A13 present sub-samples over time, maturity and floating rate notes and fixed 
rate notes, and do not reveal any significant changes of sign by the firm and bond variables. 
Some variables are not significant over sub-samples, like asset return volatility and 
convertibility being only significant for longer term bonds or convertibility, asset turnover and 
issue size being only significant for more recently issued bonds.   
How the relations are affected by rerunning the regressions on the sub-samples of the 
financial sector and the non-financial industries are important in order to test whether the 
different balance sheets or the extent of government regulation of the former sector affects the 
estimated coefficients (The Norwegian Central Bank, 2004). Some coefficients change sign, 
but only asset turnover experiences a significant change of sign. The relationship for 
financials is positive, while the relationship to the remainder of industries is negative. This 
need not discredit the inclusion of asset turnover in the model, as it is possible that asset 
turnover represents the variation across industries of firm characteristics. Consequently a 
positive relation within the financial sector does not necessarily contrast with a negative 
relation for the sample as a whole. The rest of the firm characteristics are not consistently 
significant across industries, while callable bonds and maturity maintains their significant 
relations. 
An equally important robustness check involves randomly removing multiple bonds issued by 
a firm in the same year. Firms in banking and real estate will, owing to their frequent bonds 
issues, experience a sharp decline in their share of bonds. The characteristics of these firms 
may have a larger influence in determining the coefficients of the regression due to the 
constant nature of firm characteristics of bonds issued in the same year. Table A15 reports the 
models after removal of multiple issues per year by the same firm. The sample size of 475 
bonds illustrates the extent to which some firms issue many bonds annually.  All firm and 
bond variables are at least significant at the 10 percent level and of equal sign, which means 
my concern was uncalled-for.  
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Of the board variables, tenure is significantly negative over time, maturities and return-types, 
and has the right sign for other industries than banking and finance and after removing 
multiple issuers per year by the same firm. The consistently significant nature of tenure 
supports the conclusion of experience as an important characteristic of the board.  Age is 
weakly significant over time and strongly significant after removing multiple issues by the 
same firm. The latter robustness model also reveals show a higher ratio of female directors 
lead to a lower spread and how enhanced diversity of tenure increases the spread.   
 
8. Summary 
 The principal goal of this thesis is to investigate the relation of factors that represent the 
structure of corporate boards to the bond spread required by creditors as compensation for 
risk. The primary lesson learned is of creditors who take into account the structure of the 
board in their investment decisions. Whether the board structure is taken explicitly or 
implicitly into account, through other variables such as the board structure affecting the 
quality of financial reporting or performance, is difficult to discern. My findings are, 
regardless of the cause, a valuable contribution to the debate regarding optimal board 
structure and corporate governance in the aftermath of recent governance scandals. Many high 
profiled participants argue in favour of smaller and more independent boards. My results 
show how a reduced board size will be positively perceived by creditors, who require a 
smaller risk premium for bonds issued by smaller boards. The arguments presented in favour 
of increased independence, however, are not supported by the investors in my sample bonds, 
which seems, judging by the relation between independence, CEOs serving on the board and 
the cost of debt, to attach little value to the independence of a board. 
Using age and tenure as proxies of experience, I find support for the hypothesis of increased 
experience being beneficial to the board. The practical implications are that Norwegian board 
members can stay in their position for longer periods to harness the benefits of tenure and that 
older board members’ business experience contributes positively to the efficacy of the board. 
Opposite, my models are inconclusive with regard to the benefits to creditors of gender 
equality and diversity with respect to tenure and age. 
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Of the firm characteristics I was unable to estimate a significant relation to leverage, and 
present two explanations of this result. Firstly, an endogeneity problem can be the result of 
firms choosing an optimal level of leverage in accordance with the trade of theory of the 
capital structure. Alternatively, Norwegian firms may maintain a too low level of leverage as 
described by the pecking order of finance. The other firm characteristics are more 
straightforward, such as a negative relation of firm size and a positive relation of risk. While 
investigating the characteristics of the individual bonds, I documented a negative relation of 
issue size, which is argued to be a proxy for liquidity. I furthermore indentified a yield curve 
shaped by firms segmenting themselves into different maturities based on firm risk.  
The process of writing this thesis has highlighted some interesting extensions of my results. 
My measure of independence has both advantages and disadvantages. It would be interesting 
to investigate how the relation to the spread and performance changes if the affiliation of each 
director is determined based on qualitative information describing his relation to the firm. 
Moreover, future increased size and breath of the Norwegian bond market may bring about a 
more varied sample of bonds for estimation of relation to board and firm variables. 
Furthermore, enlarged liquidity of secondary market data may also enable researcher to 
estimate the yield to maturity of the same bond over time, and possibly enables proper 
estimation of fixed effects models.  Fixed effect estimation can control for the endogeneity 
problems, which have been the culprit of much uncertainty regarding the interpretation of my 
findings. Lastly, my results point to a low importance of asset return volatility and leverage. 
These variables are based on accounting measures, and the use of data from equity markets 
may provide a much stronger relation to the spread.  
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Table A8 - Alternative OLS-regression models of bond spread (bp) 
    1 2 3 4 
F
ir
m
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
Asset return  volatility 186.68*** 198.12*** 166.16*** 186.63*** 
2.9 3.15 2.84 2.89 
Asset Turnover -70.48*** -76.79*** -66.85*** -71*** 
-3.1 -3.08 -3.10 -3.13 
ln(Total Assets) -18.48** -20.66* -17.95** -18.23** 
-1.99 -1.81 -2.27 -1.97 
Leverage -2.71 
-0.08 
Leverage*Volatility 478.46 
0.98   
B
o
n
d
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
Maturity 35.51*** 35.47*** 36.31*** 35.55*** 
4.67 3.9 4.79 4.69 
Maturity^2 -3.13*** -3.19*** -3.29*** -3.13*** 
 
-4.1 -3.18 -4.47 -4.11 
Callable 121.66*** 119.59*** 128.55*** 121.66*** 
5.75 4.66 6.05 5.71 
Convertible -61.25 -96.09** -67.7* -61.2 
 
-1.61 -2.02 -1.84 -1.60 
ln(Amount Issued) -28.38** -31.6** -22.11** -28.43** 
  -2.47 -2.54 -2.13 -2.47 
B
o
a
rd
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
ln(Board Size) 47.4 46.27 
1.35 1.61 
Board Size 14.71 
1.02 
Board Size^2 -0.51 
-0.59 
Average Tenure -25.25*** -22.16*** -26.79 
-3.5 -2.6 -1.55 
Average Tenure^2 0.21 
 
0.10 
Multiple Directorships -0.22 -1.07 -0.22 
 
-0.22 -0.94 -0.23 
Average share female  -49.24 -68.82 -48.56 
 
-1.08 -1.28 -1.06 
Std Tenure 17.07 22.6 17.42 
 
1.35 1.55 1.36 
Share independent 0.85 
 
0.03 
Dual pos CEO -14.23 
-0.6 
Adjusted R
2
 0.6486 0.6646  0.6457 0.6485 
  N 1170 979 1220 1170 
Bond spread in basis points. Asset volatility and asset turnover as fractions 
Callable, convertible and Dual pos CEO as dummy variables 
Sign represents the relationships discussed in section 2. 
Constant, year and industry dummy variables are included, but not reported in this table 
*, ** and *** denotes signifiance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Reported t-values and signficance levels are estimated using firm clustered standard errors 
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Table A9 - OLS-regression of all firm and bond variables 
    Sign 1   
F
ir
m
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
Return on assets - -181.98 
-1.22 
Leverage + 17.26 
  
0.41 
Asset  return 
volatility + 137.64** 
  
2.00 
Asset Turnover ? -68.16** 
-2.38 
ln(Total Assets) - -24.9** 
  
-2.42 
Firm listed - 8.83 
0.45 
Block-holders ? -12.78 
    -0.24   
B
o
n
d
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
Maturity + 47.01*** 
4.25 
Maturity^2 - -3.89*** 
-3.86 
Callable + 107.09*** 
4.78 
Convertible - -99.28** 
-2.21 
Bond listed - -18.48 
-0.92 
Floating rate notes ? -25.54 
-1.60 
ln(Amount Issued) - -15.24 
-1.38 
Adjusted R
2
 0.6432 
  N   955   
Bond spread in basis points. Asset volatility and asset turnover as fractions 
Callable and convertible  as dummy variables 
Sign represents the relationships discussed in section 2. 
Constant, year and industry dummy variables are included, but not reported in this table 
*, ** and *** denotes signifiance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Reported t-values and signficance levels are estimated using firm clustered standard errors 
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Table A10 - Standardized coefficients of bond spread 
    Sign 1 2 3 4 
F
ir
m
 c
h
a
r.
 
Asset return  volatility + 0.1*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.1*** 
2.91 2.6 3.27 2.72 
Asset Turnover ? -0.19*** -0.2*** -0.21*** -0.22*** 
-3.13 -3.66 -3.07 -3.54 
ln(Total Assets) - -0.12** -0.16*** -0.13* -0.14** 
-1.97 -2.6 -1.78 -2.37 
B
o
n
d
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
Maturity + 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.35*** 
4.69 4.94 3.93 4.77 
Maturity^2 - -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.29*** 
-4.12 -4.44 -3.21 -4.39 
Callable + 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 
5.75 5.32 4.70 5.10 
Convertible - -0.06 -0.05 -0.08** -0.05 
  
-1.61 -1.49 -2.00 -1.47 
ln(Amount Issued) - -0.11** -0.1** -0.12** -0.1** 
    -2.46 -2.13 -2.52 -2.21 
B
o
a
rd
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
ln(Board Size) ? 0.07 0.09** 0.08 0.08* 
 
1.6 1.99 1.44 1.91 
Average Tenure - -0.17*** -0.15*** 
 
-3.55 -2.75 
Average Age - -0.1*** -0.07*** 
 
-2.88 -2.65 
Multiple Directorships - -0.01 0.09 -0.05 0.1*** 
 
-0.22 1.51 -0.9 2.93 
Average share female  ? -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 
 
-1.07 -0.79 -1.46 -1.17 
Std Tenure ? 0.07 0.09 
 
1.34 1.64 
Std Age ? -0.06 0.03 
 
-1.12 1.09 
Independence - 0.03 
 
0.88 
Dual pos CEO ? -0.03 
 
-0.6 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
 0.6485  0.6471  0.6653 0.6493 
  N   1170 1206 979 1118 
Bond spread in basis points. Asset volatility and asset turnover as fractions 
Callable, convertible and Dual pos CEO as dummy variables 
Sign represents the relationships discussed in section 2. 
Constant, year and industry dummy variables are included, but not reported in this table 
*, ** and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Reported t-values and significance levels are estimated using firm clustered standard errors 
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Table A11 - Robustness over time 
Regression 1 Regression 4 
  Estimated sign <=2005 >2005 <=2005 >2005 
F
ir
m
 c
h
a
r.
 
Asset return  volatility + 329.99*** 176.65** 215.27*** 196.57*** 
3.65 2.52 2.64 2.73 
Asset Turnover - -14.51 -115.3*** -22.18 -121.8*** 
-0.64 -3.48 -1.24 -3.61 
ln(Total Assets) - -16.31* -17.77 -17.85** -17.71 
  
-1.89 -1.37 -2.33 -1.36 
B
o
n
d
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
Maturity + 24.35*** 44.72*** 23.81*** 47.46*** 
3.34 4.2 3.18 4.36 
Maturity^2 - -2.09*** -4.12*** -1.96** -4.33*** 
  
-2.66 -3.88 -2.56 -4.15 
Callable + 107.77*** 131*** 73.66*** 137.74*** 
3.83 4.38 3.21 4.38 
Convertible - 34.89 -118.48** 40.18 -113.96** 
0.79 -2.09 0.92 -1.98 
ln(Amount Issued) - 1.53 -51.77*** -1.08 -49.97*** 
    0.12 -3.12 -0.08 -2.93 
B
o
a
rd
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
ln(Board Size) + 35.63 59.91 25.25 81.2* 
 
0.71 1.47 0.55 1.87 
Average Tenure - -29.62** -24.51*** 
 
-2.45 -2.87 
Average Age - -3.12* -4.36** 
 
-1.96 -2.18 
Multiple Directorships - 0.88 -1.96 6.74*** 1.13 
 
0.89 -1.38 3.21 0.66 
Average share female  ? -66.37 -31.07 -102.21** -33.27 
 
-1.01 -0.44 -2.08 -0.52 
Std Tenure ? 3.54 21.6* 
 
0.15 1.66 
Std Age ? 3.58 1.72 
 
1.28 0.68 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.6552 0.6505 0.6690 0.6426 
  N   529 641 515 603 
Bond spread in basis points. Asset volatility and asset turnover as fractions 
Callable, convertible and Dual pos CEO as dummy variables 
Sign represents the relationships discussed in section 2. 
Constant, year and industry dummy variables are included, but not reported in this table 
*, ** and *** denotes significance  at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Reported t-values and significance  levels are estimated using firm clustered standard errors 
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Table A12 - Robustness across return types 
Regression 1 Regression 4 
  Estimated sign Fixed FRN Fixed FRN 
F
ir
m
 c
h
a
r.
 
Asset return  volatility + 225.5*** 194.94* 228.82*** 200.61* 
3.03 1.79 3.11 1.74 
Asset Turnover - -80.79*** -6.23 -89.2*** -32.82 
-3.13 -0.22 -3.20 -1.18 
ln(Total Assets) - -27.65*** 1.85 -29.02*** -3.44 
  
-2.95 0.14 -3.31 -0.29 
B
o
n
d
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
Maturity + 43.39*** 23.46** 44.54*** 17.81** 
4.64 2.58 4.37 2.32 
Maturity^2 - -3.74*** -2.04*** -3.76*** -1.66*** 
  
-4.59 -2.61 -4.27 -2.81 
Callable + 149.51*** 131.39*** 129.81*** 133.39*** 
5.1 5.67 4.28 5.42 
Convertible - -51.31 -489.14*** -51.19 -428.06*** 
-1.31 -4.38 -1.32 -3.23 
ln(Amount Issued) - -36.2*** -41.81*** -33.64** -35.98** 
    -2.77 -2.65 -2.44 -2.32 
B
o
a
rd
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
ln(Board Size) + 81.83** 5.48 101.75** 30.55 
 
2.07 0.15 2.33 0.79 
Average Tenure - -18.53** -30.82*** 
 
-2.1 -3.15 
Average Age - -4.35** -2.48 
 
-2.27 -1.32 
Multiple Directorships - -0.1 -0.21 3.89** 4.31** 
 
-0.11 -0.13 2.01 2.39 
Average share female  ? 9.11 -50.11 20.09 -81.32 
 
0.17 -0.8 0.39 -1.39 
Std Tenure ? 14.45 15.61 
 
0.92 1.02 
Std Age ? 1.81 2.12 
 
0.64 0.99 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.6738  0.6864  0.6752 0.6985 
  N   749 421 693 425 
Bond spread in basis points. Asset volatility and asset turnover as fractions 
Callable, convertible and Dual pos CEO as dummy variables 
Sign represents the relationships discussed in section 2. 
Constant, year and industry dummy variables are included, but not reported in this table 
*, ** and *** denotes significance  at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Reported t-values and significance  levels are estimated using firm clustered standard errors 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
Table A13 - Robustness over maturity 
Regression 1 Regression 4 
  Estimated sign <=1 >1 <=1 >1 
F
ir
m
 c
h
a
r.
 
Asset return  volatility + -56.91 180.7** 73.48 170.51** 
-0.14 2.45 0.16 2.29 
Asset Turnover - -43.87* -96.54*** -56.94 -100.66*** 
-1.74 -2.98 -1.66 -3.32 
ln(Total Assets) - -13.42 -9.35 -17.97 -12.08 
  
-1.13 -0.83 -1.37 -1.13 
B
o
n
d
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
Maturity + 123.08* -9.65 144.57* -2.06 
1.67 -0.91 1.68 -0.20 
Maturity^2 - -34.84 0.27 -48.19 -0.25 
  
-1.09 0.35 -1.28 -0.34 
Callable + 274.86*** 96.53*** 270.75*** 90.22*** 
3.61 4.61 3.31 4.25 
Convertible - -9.49 -88.52** -40.72 -82.14** 
-0.06 -2.46 -0.22 -2.32 
ln(Amount Issued) - -30.4* -37.47** -23.38 -35.74** 
    -1.73 -2.55 -1.38 -2.42 
B
o
a
rd
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
ln(Board Size) + 58.81 38.93 65.66 42.5 
 
1.01 1.07 1 1.13 
Average Tenure - -20.95* -27.06*** 
 
-1.86 -2.99 
Average Age - -4.92 -1.29 
 
-1.52 -0.68 
Multiple Directorships - -0.87 1.4 2.45 5.07*** 
 
-1.13 0.94 1.21 3.16 
Average share female  ? -17.24 -85.98 -25.06 -76.84 
 
-0.24 -1.41 -0.42 -1.37 
Std Tenure ? -0.37 21.15 
 
-0.02 1.24 
Std Age ? 5.78 1.02 
 
1.36 0.45 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.5105 0.6812 0.5123 0.6791 
  N   596 574 541 577 
Bond spread in basis points. Asset volatility and asset turnover as fractions 
Callable, convertible and Dual pos CEO as dummy variables 
Sign represents the relationships discussed in section 2. 
Constant, year and industry dummy variables are included, but not reported in this table 
*, ** and *** denotes significance  at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Reported t-values and significance  levels are estimated using firm clustered standard errors 
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Table A14 - Robustness of the financial sector and other industries 
Regression 1 Regression 4 
  Estimated sign Other sectors Financials Other sectors Financials 
F
ir
m
 c
h
a
r.
 
Asset return  volatility + 190.22*** 58.67 172.62*** 69.45 
3.12 0.29 2.59 0.36 
Asset Turnover - -105.83*** 142.26*** -108.84*** 135.48*** 
-3.8 3.34 -3.88 3.12 
ln(Total Assets) - -47.88*** -3.17 -47.11*** -3.45 
  
-3.88 -0.79 -3.57 -0.72 
B
o
n
d
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
Maturity + 35.26*** 18.8*** 42.67*** 18.44*** 
3.64 2.94 4.32 2.92 
Maturity^2 - -2.69*** -1.14 -3.17*** -1.13 
  
-3.14 -1.59 -3.80 -1.60 
Callable + 123.85*** 60.02*** 123.6*** 60.45*** 
4.25 3.42 4.12 3.30 
Convertible - -84.6** -20.37 -76.44* -20.75 
-2.1 -0.22 -1.91 -0.23 
ln(Amount Issued) - -26.85* -7.85 -28.73* -6.57 
    -1.8 -1.23 -1.72 -1.11 
B
o
a
rd
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
ln(Board Size) + 65.99* -5.03 60.01 -0.32 
 
1.82 -0.18 1.58 -0.01 
Average Tenure - -31.03*** -5.47 
 
-3.33 -1.44 
Average Age - -5.66*** -0.73 
 
-2.70 -1.02 
Multiple Directorships - -0.42 1.03 4.44*** 0.83 
 
-0.44 0.8 2.63 0.66 
Average share female  ? -100.88 -6.87 -48.51 -16.02 
 
-1.37 -0.28 -0.67 -0.67 
Std Tenure ? 20.38 1.41 
 
1.15 0.18 
Std Age ? 4.96* -1.19 
 
1.68 -0.59 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.6428 0.6089 0.6176 0.6149 
  N   704 466 626 492 
Bond spread in basis points. Asset volatility and asset turnover as fractions 
Callable, convertible and Dual pos CEO as dummy variables 
Sign represents the relationships discussed in section 2. 
Constant, year and industry dummy variables are included, but not reported in this table 
*, ** and *** denotes significance  at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Reported t-values and significance  levels are estimated using firm clustered standard errors 
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Table A15 - Robustness after removing multiple bonds per year per firm 
  Estimated sign Regression 1 Regression 4 
F
ir
m
 c
h
a
r.
 
Asset return  volatility + 190.3*** 170.21** 
3 2.52 
Asset Turnover - -137.06*** -135.26*** 
-4.09 -3.86 
ln(Total Assets) - -22.93** -24.27** 
  
-2.18 -2.29 
B
o
n
d
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
Maturity + 33.96*** 40.04*** 
3.26 3.95 
Maturity^2 - -2.84*** -3.2*** 
  
-3.13 -3.82 
Callable + 118.78*** 111.16*** 
4.84 4.37 
Convertible - -78.89* -80.36* 
  
-1.73 -1.75 
ln(Amount Issued) - -34.52** -32.5** 
    -2.22 -2.01 
B
o
a
rd
 c
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s 
ln(Board Size) + 59.83* 68.66* 
 
1.8 1.91 
Average Tenure - -36.41*** 
 
-4.08 
Average Age - -4.92** 
 
-2.39 
Multiple Directorships - -0.71 3.43** 
 
-0.5 2.07 
Average share female  ? -113.53* -67.35 
 
-1.77 -1.06 
Std Tenure ? 29.73** 
 
1.98 
Std Age ? 2.54 
 
0.94 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.6128 0.5974 
  N   475 468 
Bond spread in basis points. Asset volatility and asset turnover as fractions 
Callable, convertible and Dual pos CEO as dummy variables 
Sign represents the relationships discussed in section 2. 
Constant, year and industry dummy variables are included, but not reported in this table 
*, ** and *** denotes significance  at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Reported t-values and significance  levels are estimated using firm clustered standard errors 
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Table A16 – F-tests of joint significance of coefficients 
# Relationship Regression F-value P-value 
1 Squared board size A8-1 1.41 0.2457 
2 Squared maturity 3-1 11.28 0.0000 
3 Interaction volatility A8-3 7.04 0.0011 
4 Interaction leverage A8-3 0.53 0.5873 
5 Squared Tenure A8-4  6.39 0.0020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
